Taiwan Relations Act

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) is a landmark statute enacted by the United States Congress in 1979 to govern all unofficial relations between the United States and Taiwan following Washington’s diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Act has since served as the legal foundation for substantial, though non-diplomatic, ties with Taiwan, ensuring continuity in economic, cultural, and security relations. Framed amid significant geopolitical shifts in East Asia during the late 1970s, the Act remains central to American policy concerning Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

Geopolitical Background and Passage of the Act

The late 1970s were defined by major changes in the strategic calculations of the PRC. At the Third Plenum of 1978, Deng Xiaoping initiated a decisive shift away from Maoist ideology and towards the programme of reform and opening, marking a profound transformation in China’s domestic and foreign policy. In contrast to previous decades in which the United States had been viewed as the principal adversary, Deng identified the Soviet Union as China’s primary security threat. This reorientation facilitated closer Sino-American cooperation, particularly in the context of the Cold War. China supported U.S. actions in Afghanistan through Operation Cyclone and engaged in military conflict against Vietnam, which it regarded as a Soviet-aligned state.
Amid this convergence of interests, the United States and the PRC concluded the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, which came into effect on 1 January 1979. This communiqué required Washington to end its formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and to terminate the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. The ROC government responded by mobilising influential supporters within the United States—commonly referred to as the China Lobby—to advocate for congressional legislation that would preserve a security framework for Taiwan despite the loss of diplomatic recognition.
A constitutional challenge emerged when Senator Barry Goldwater and others contested President Jimmy Carter’s unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty, arguing that Senate approval was constitutionally required for treaty abrogation. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, dismissed the case of Goldwater v. Carter as non-justiciable, leaving unresolved the extent of presidential authority in terminating treaties.
Seeking to ensure Taiwan’s continued protection and stable relations, Congress drafted and passed the Taiwan Relations Act. President Carter signed the Act into law in April 1979, applying it retroactively to the date of the diplomatic shift. Congress rejected the State Department’s milder draft and instead adopted stronger language guaranteeing ongoing ties through institutional mechanisms such as the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private corporation designated to handle U.S. interests in Taiwan without formal diplomatic status.

Definitions and De Facto Diplomatic Structure

The TRA adopts the terminology “governing authorities on Taiwan” rather than “Republic of China”, reflecting the United States’ shift in diplomatic recognition. In defining Taiwan, the Act includes the island of Taiwan and the Penghu (Pescadores) archipelago. Other territories under ROC administration, such as Kinmen and the Matsu Islands, are not explicitly included within this definition.
Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, the Act authorises the continuation of substantive relations. The AIT functions as the de facto U.S. embassy in Taiwan, empowered to issue visas, conduct negotiations, and implement U.S. policy. Existing pre-1979 bilateral agreements remain valid unless formally terminated. Under American federal law, Taiwan is treated in most respects as a foreign nation for administrative and legal purposes, ensuring consistency in trade, immigration, and other regulatory frameworks.

Defence and Security Provisions

The TRA is best known for its security provisions. While it does not obligate the United States to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack, it establishes a statutory framework designed to preserve Taiwan’s ability to maintain its own self-defence. The Act requires the United States to provide defence articles and services necessary to sustain a sufficient defensive capability. It also obligates the U.S. government to maintain military readiness to resist coercion or force that could jeopardise Taiwan’s security or its social or economic system.
These provisions underpin the doctrine known as strategic ambiguity, whereby the United States seeks simultaneously to deter the PRC from using force against Taiwan and to discourage Taiwan from making unilateral declarations of independence. The Act further states that any non-peaceful effort to determine Taiwan’s future will be considered a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States.
Successive administrations have interpreted these requirements differently, but arms sales to Taiwan have continued despite PRC objections. China consistently argues that American military support contravenes the Three Communiqués and constitutes interference in its internal affairs.

Evolution of U.S. Policy and Chinese Responses

The passage of the TRA significantly affected Chinese perceptions of American intentions. Deng Xiaoping, initially optimistic about U.S.–China cooperation, came to view the Act as evidence of American unwillingness to fully sever ties with Taiwan. Even as the PRC sought to enhance its global standing by aligning itself with non-aligned states and supporting nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it remained wary of American commitments to Taiwan.
During the Reagan administration, the United States and the PRC issued the August 17 Communiqué of 1982, in which Washington stated an intention to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan. However, this position was qualified by the “Six Assurances” given to Taiwan, which affirmed that the United States had not agreed to end arms sales, had not recognised PRC sovereignty over Taiwan, and had not altered its position on the future of the island. These assurances remain an essential element of Taiwan–U.S. relations.
Throughout the 1990s, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to the TRA. A resolution passed during the Clinton administration declared that the Act would take precedence over the Three Communiqués in guiding U.S. policy towards Taiwan. Congressional statements and annual reaffirmations underscored the enduring bipartisan support for the TRA as the cornerstone of American engagement.

Developments in the Twenty-First Century

In the early twenty-first century, U.S. policy continued to reflect the TRA’s principles. A Congressional Research Service report in 2007 confirmed that the United States does not recognise PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. Despite this, Washington has maintained its One-China policy while continuing to supply Taiwan with defensive arms, prompting repeated protests from Beijing.
Bipartisan affirmation of the TRA gained renewed emphasis in 2016. Shortly before Taiwan’s newly elected president Tsai Ing-wen assumed office, senators Marco Rubio and Bob Menendez introduced a resolution reaffirming the TRA and the Six Assurances as foundational to U.S.–Taiwan relations. The Republican Party’s 2016 platform echoed this stance, emphasising peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, support for Taiwan’s self-defence, and encouragement of deeper economic and security cooperation.