PSLV-C62 and the Bigger Picture: Why India’s Space Power Is Falling Behind

The failure of the PSLV-C62 mission is not merely a setback for a launch vehicle or for the Indian Space Research Organisation. It is a warning signal about deeper, structural weaknesses in India’s space ecosystem at a time when space has become central not just to economic growth, but to military power and strategic autonomy. As space increasingly shapes outcomes across land, sea, air, cyber and information domains, India’s relative slippage carries consequences far beyond prestige.

Five failures in seven years — but the real concern lies elsewhere

This is the fifth ISRO failure in the past seven years. While launch failures occur even in the most advanced space programmes, what distinguishes India’s case is the broader stagnation visible across the space value chain. Despite being the world’s fourth-largest economy, India is losing ground to established space powers — the US, China, Russia, the EU and Japan — across all three segments of space activity: upstream (satellite constellations), midstream (data aggregation and processing), and downstream (commercial services and revenue generation).

The concern is not episodic failure, but systemic underperformance.

Prestige missions versus commercial and strategic depth

India’s emphasis on prestige programmes such as Gaganyaan has come at a cost. In 2017, India held an estimated 35 per cent share of the global small satellite launch market. By 2024, that share had effectively fallen to zero. Reliability concerns, slower launch frequency and limited launch infrastructure have eroded India’s competitive edge.

At the same time, satellite production timelines have stretched, and India is rapidly running out of suitable orbital slots — a problem compounded by delays in filings with the International Telecommunication Union. While American and Chinese firms have made hundreds of thousands of ITU filings to lock in spectrum and orbits, India has moved far more slowly.

NavIC and the limits of self-reliance

India’s experience with satellite navigation illustrates this drift. After the US restricted GPS signals during the Kargil conflict, India developed its own navigation system, NavIC. Yet today, India has only four fully functional NavIC satellites, of which two are nearing the end of their operational lives — well below the minimum required constellation.

Even the successful launch of ISRO’s GSLV-F15 in January 2025 did not fully compensate for this gap, as anomalies prevented the NVS-02 satellite from reaching its final orbit. Meanwhile, China’s Beidou system has matured into a robust, global navigation network — and Google Maps remains dominant in India, even though Indian alternatives like Mappls are better suited to local conditions.

China’s rapid advance — and South Asia as the testbed

China’s space reforms have translated into strategic expansion in India’s neighbourhood. In 2025 alone, China launched four satellites for Pakistan, and Chinese firm Piesat secured a $406 million deal for 20 satellites by sharply undercutting Pakistan’s own space agency, SUPARCO. China also launched a satellite for Nepal, even as a Nepalese satellite was lost aboard PSLV-C62.

This is not benign commercial activity. It is the embedding of Chinese space infrastructure across South Asia, creating long-term strategic dependencies.

Space, data sovereignty and military vulnerability

Operation Sindoor exposed India’s continued reliance on foreign satellite constellations for remote sensing and intelligence — often with selective delays in data availability. By contrast, China reportedly provided Pakistan with extensive civilian commercial satellite imagery in the months preceding the Pahalgam terror attack, enabling detailed planning.

India’s own electronic intelligence (ELINT) capability remains embryonic. An experimental satellite has not been followed by formation-flying ELINT constellations due to lack of funding and a clear roadmap. China, meanwhile, operates over 170 ELINT satellites across 15 constellations — a capability that Pakistani officials claimed allowed them to electronically track Indian Air Force aircraft during Sindoor.

The institutional gap in military space power

Unlike the US, Russia and China — all of which have dedicated military space forces — India’s Defence Space Agency, raised only in 2019, remains underpowered and lower-ranked. It is staffed largely by non-specialists and lacks the authority needed to integrate space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.

The result is fragmented data silos across services and agencies, preventing the creation of a unified, real-time common operating picture. Even Pakistan has moved faster, establishing a space command under its Air Force and integrating it with cyber operations.

The scale of the asymmetry

China’s defence budget is roughly three times India’s, but the space asymmetry far exceeds what such a ratio would suggest. In 2024, China operated around 396 remote sensing satellites out of more than a thousand active satellites globally. India’s Space-Based Surveillance-III plan envisages just 52 defence satellites by 2030 — a target that already looks unrealistic given that only one defence satellite was launched between 2023 and 2025.

With China increasingly launching satellites for Pakistan, this imbalance risks translating into direct operational disadvantage for India.

What can be done — and what cannot wait

Short-term stopgaps — such as purchasing foreign satellites, launching Indian satellites from foreign soil, or acquiring commercial imagery — may marginally reduce dependence. But they do not address the core issue: India’s lack of data sovereignty in space.

Atmanirbharta in space is not a slogan; it is a strategic necessity. India’s limited space assets are already being tested by Chinese counter-space capabilities, including close-proximity manoeuvres and attempted jamming during the Galwan standoff.

Why PSLV-C62 should trigger hard decisions

The lesson of PSLV-C62 is not about failure tolerance, but about urgency. Without time-bound accountability, empowered institutions, accelerated launch capacity, and a coherent military–commercial space roadmap, India risks ceding the space domain — and with it, decisive advantages in future conflicts.

If Sindoor 2.0 is indeed inevitable, then clarity on space policy cannot wait. In modern warfare, the side that controls data controls outcomes. And today, India is dangerously short of both.