Second Anglo Dutch War

The Second Anglo-Dutch War was a major seventeenth-century naval conflict fought between the Kingdom of England and the Dutch Republic from 4 March 1665 until the Treaty of Breda on 31 July 1667. It formed part of the series of Anglo-Dutch Wars driven by intense commercial rivalry, colonial competition and disagreements over maritime regulation. Although the war featured several large engagements and innovations in naval tactics, neither side secured a decisive military victory. By late 1666 the conflict had entered a costly stalemate, and peace negotiations stalled until the dramatic Dutch Raid on the Medway in June 1667 forced England to concede favourable terms to the Dutch. The settlement removed many of the earlier economic and territorial disputes and subsequently enabled both nations to cooperate against the expansionist ambitions of Louis XIV of France.

Background and Origins of the Conflict

The roots of the Second Anglo-Dutch War lay in unresolved tensions from the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652–1654). The Treaty of Westminster had brought hostilities to an end but left the main issues unresolved, notably English dissatisfaction with Dutch commercial monopolies and Dutch opposition to the Navigation Acts of 1651. With England and the Dutch Republic competing fiercely for dominance in global trade, even periods of peace were marked by conflict in overseas markets, especially in Asia, Africa and the Americas.
Political developments within the Dutch Republic and England also shaped the crisis. From 1650 to 1672, Dutch politics was dominated by the States Party under Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt, who sought diplomatic accommodation with England following the 1660 Stuart Restoration. He envisaged a network of overlapping defensive agreements with both England and France to secure Dutch commercial interests. However, the English government regarded such arrangements as unfavourable without significant Dutch concessions.
The Navigation Acts were reinstated and strengthened in 1660 and 1663, reflecting demands for greater protectionism from English merchants. Charles II also encouraged royal involvement in commerce as a means of reducing reliance on Parliament for revenue. In 1660 he and his brother James established the Royal African Company to challenge Dutch predominance in the Atlantic slave trade. Its powerful investors had strong influence over national policy, viewing confrontation with the Dutch as economically advantageous.
Events escalated in 1664 when English forces occupied New Netherland and seized Dutch West India Company posts in West Africa. A Dutch naval expedition under Michiel de Ruyter recovered several of these positions early in 1665, causing financial disaster for the Royal African Company. The English attacks, combined with Anglo-Dutch competition in three interconnected arenas—the Atlantic, Caribbean and North American colonies—made war increasingly likely.
International diplomacy complicated the situation further. The Dutch relied on a 1662 defensive treaty with France, in which Louis XIV promised support if the Republic were attacked. Yet many Dutch leaders grew wary of French expansionism in the Spanish Netherlands. Negotiations with England remained slow, hindered by the complex provincial structures of Dutch politics and the influence of major trading companies such as the VOC. English officials, including Sir George Downing, believed the Dutch could not afford a war, while advisers to Charles II argued that provoking the Dutch into declaring war would negate French treaty obligations. After English attacks on Dutch shipping, the Dutch formally declared war on 4 March 1665.

Opposing Forces and Naval Tactics

The war took place during a transformative period for naval warfare akin to the Military Revolution on land. Both the English and Dutch navies deployed fleets exceeding one hundred ships, operating some of the most technologically advanced and manpower-intensive vessels of the era. Efficient organisation and coordinated manoeuvre were critical, prompting significant tactical innovation.
The Royal Navy’s 1664 Fighting Instructions formalised the line-of-battle formation as standard practice and introduced a signalling system to improve command control. This tactic suited the heavier English ships, which emphasised gunnery intended to cripple or sink opponents. The Dutch, with lighter ships and a tradition of aggressive boarding actions, faced difficulties implementing the line system. Poor communication and the risk of collisions often led to chaotic engagements in which individual captains acted independently.
Both navies fielded mixed fleets of purpose-built warships and armed merchantmen. Dutch merchant vessels, numerous within the fleet, were vulnerable to the heavier English ships. Following lessons from the First Anglo-Dutch War, the Dutch had begun constructing larger ships of the line, yet by 1665 most of the new, heavier designs remained incomplete. English warships such as those carrying over one hundred guns maintained an initial qualitative advantage.
Financial pressures, however, gradually undermined English superiority. While the Dutch had reformed their credit system, enabling them to borrow efficiently, the English relied on optimistic expectations that privateering would offset the cost of war. Despite Parliament granting £2.5 million for naval expenditure in 1664, much was consumed by repairs or misappropriated. As war expenses mounted, Charles II resorted to short-term loans at unfavourable interest rates. By late 1666 financial strain forced the partial disbandment of the English fleet, with damaging strategic consequences.

Major Engagements and Developments

Both nations initially anticipated a short conflict. The English sought a quick victory before financial limitations became crippling, while the Dutch aimed to limit disruption to their commercial networks.
Grand Pensionary de Witt instructed Admiral Jacob van Wassenaer Obdam to engage the English fleet despite Dutch disadvantages in firepower and training. The resulting Battle of Lowestoft on 13 June 1665 proved disastrous for the Dutch. They lost approximately sixteen ships, with more than a third of their personnel killed or captured. Obdam himself perished in the fighting. This defeat prompted a sweeping reform of Dutch naval command, with several captains executed or dismissed for alleged cowardice.
Michiel de Ruyter assumed command in July 1665 and adopted the line-of-battle tactic, enhancing Dutch fleet discipline. The Republic’s finances were bolstered by the safe return of the valuable VOC spice fleet following the Battle of Vågen. Nonetheless, military setbacks continued, including the occupation of Overijssel by forces from the Prince-Bishopric of Münster.
As the conflict progressed into 1666 and 1667, both sides mounted large-scale operations but increasingly strained resources limited their strategic reach. The war culminated in the Dutch raid on the River Medway in June 1667, one of the most daring naval actions of the age. The destruction of English ships at anchor and the capture of the flagship Royal Charles humiliated the English government and forced Charles II to negotiate peace.

The Treaty of Breda and Its Aftermath

The Treaty of Breda, signed on 31 July 1667, concluded the war on terms largely favourable to the Dutch. It resolved key commercial disputes, softened the application of the Navigation Acts and stabilised colonial possessions. England retained New York, while the Dutch secured Suriname and strengthened their position in global trade networks.