Emmanuel Levinas

Emmanuel Levinas was a French philosopher of Lithuanian-Jewish origin best known for his profound reorientation of philosophy towards ethics as first philosophy. His work challenged the dominance of ontology and epistemology in Western thought by placing responsibility to the Other at the centre of human existence. Levinas’s philosophy has had a lasting influence on ethics, phenomenology, theology, political theory, and contemporary moral philosophy.
Emmanuel Levinas argued that the fundamental question of philosophy is not what exists or how we know, but how we are ethically obligated to others. His thought emerged as a powerful response to the moral catastrophes of the twentieth century, particularly war, genocide, and totalitarianism.

Background and Intellectual Context

Emmanuel Levinas was born in 1906 in Kaunas, then part of the Russian Empire, into a Jewish family deeply engaged with Hebrew literature and religious learning. He later moved to France, where he studied philosophy and became a key figure in introducing phenomenology to the French intellectual world.
Levinas was strongly influenced by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and Martin Heidegger’s ontology, particularly Heidegger’s analysis of being and existence. However, the experience of the Second World War, during which Levinas was held as a prisoner of war while much of his family was killed in the Holocaust, led him to a radical philosophical re-evaluation. He became deeply critical of philosophies that prioritised being, totality, or knowledge over ethical responsibility.
This historical experience shaped Levinas’s lifelong concern with violence, otherness, and the moral limits of philosophy.

Ethics as First Philosophy

Levinas’s central philosophical claim is that ethics precedes ontology. He rejected the traditional Western emphasis on being, arguing that such approaches often reduce individuals to objects of knowledge or elements within systems of thought. According to Levinas, this reduction risks justifying domination and violence.
Ethics, in Levinas’s view, arises prior to reflection, choice, or theory. The ethical relation is not based on mutual agreement or rational calculation, but on an asymmetrical responsibility that binds the self to the Other. This responsibility is infinite and unconditional, meaning that the self is always already obligated to others before any deliberate decision is made.
This radical ethical stance redefined the scope and purpose of philosophy.

The Face of the Other

One of Levinas’s most influential concepts is the face of the Other. The face is not merely a physical appearance, but the immediate presence of another person who resists objectification. Encountering the face of the Other confronts the self with a moral demand: “Thou shalt not kill.”
The face expresses vulnerability, exposure, and alterity. It interrupts the self’s freedom and calls it into question. This encounter is ethical rather than cognitive; it cannot be fully captured by concepts, categories, or representations.
For Levinas, the face-to-face relation is the foundation of morality and the origin of social life. It establishes responsibility before rights, duty before freedom, and obligation before autonomy.

Otherness and Alterity

Levinas placed strong emphasis on alterity, the irreducible otherness of the Other. He argued that Western philosophy has historically sought to assimilate difference by integrating it into systems of sameness, identity, or totality. This tendency, Levinas claimed, undermines genuine ethical relations.
The Other must be respected as radically different and cannot be fully understood, possessed, or controlled. Ethical responsibility arises precisely because the Other exceeds the self’s comprehension and power. This excess preserves the dignity and transcendence of the Other.
Levinas’s insistence on irreducible alterity has been particularly influential in debates on human rights, multiculturalism, and ethical pluralism.

Responsibility and Asymmetry

A defining feature of Levinas’s ethics is its asymmetrical structure. Responsibility does not depend on reciprocity or equality. The self is responsible for the Other regardless of whether the Other responds in kind.
Levinas famously described responsibility as a form of substitution, in which the self takes responsibility even for the suffering and wrongdoing of others. This radical formulation challenges conventional moral theories based on contracts, mutual obligations, or individual rights.
Although this asymmetry has been criticised as overly demanding, Levinas viewed it as essential for preventing moral indifference and justifying genuine ethical concern.

Ethics, Justice, and the Third

While Levinas prioritised the face-to-face ethical relation, he also acknowledged the presence of the third, representing other others and the broader social world. The appearance of the third introduces questions of justice, law, and political organisation.
Justice requires comparison, judgement, and institutions, which inevitably involve abstraction and generalisation. Levinas did not reject politics or law but insisted that they must remain grounded in ethical responsibility. Without ethics, justice risks becoming oppressive or bureaucratic.
This tension between ethics and politics is central to Levinas’s thought and has inspired ongoing debates about the moral foundations of law and governance.

Language, Dialogue, and Meaning

Language plays a crucial role in Levinas’s philosophy. He distinguished between language as domination, where the Other is reduced to an object of discourse, and language as ethical encounter, where speech expresses openness and responsibility.
Dialogue, for Levinas, is not merely an exchange of information but a mode of ethical relation. Speaking to the Other acknowledges their presence and vulnerability, reinforcing the primacy of responsibility over control.
This view of language has influenced contemporary philosophy of communication and dialogical ethics.