Why India Is Missing from Trump’s ‘Pax Silica’ — and What It Says About Power in Today’s Geopolitics

When US President “Donald Trump” unveiled the US-led “Pax Silica” initiative — aimed at securing supply chains in critical minerals, energy, semiconductors and artificial intelligence — it immediately stood out for two reasons. First, Trump’s well-known scepticism towards multilateralism. Second, India’s conspicuous absence from a grouping that is clearly designed to counter China’s technological and resource dominance.

A multilateral club — but on Trump’s terms

Trump has never hidden his discomfort with traditional multilateral institutions. Bodies such as the “United Nations”, “NATO”, “G7” and “G20” have all faced either open hostility or strategic indifference during his presidency.

That makes “Pax Silica” unusual. It is multilateral in form but transactional in substance — a compact among countries that bring tangible, immediately usable assets to the table. The nine members — the US, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the UK, the Netherlands, Israel, the UAE and Australia — are bound not by shared values but by complementary strengths in high technology or critical resources.

Why India’s exclusion is not an anomaly

At first glance, India’s absence seems puzzling. If the initiative is implicitly aimed at countering China, why exclude the world’s largest democracy and a strategic partner of the US?

In Trump’s worldview, the answer is straightforward. Each member of “Pax Silica” contributes either cutting-edge technological capability — semiconductors, AI, advanced manufacturing — or assured access to energy and minerals. India, despite its size and strategic importance, does not yet command either space. It is telling that even the “guests” include Canada, rich in minerals, and Taiwan, a global semiconductor hub — but not India.

The long shadow of underinvestment in technology

India’s weak position in high technology did not emerge overnight. For decades, research and development has remained a low national priority. India spends just 0.6–0.7% of its GDP on R&D — a figure that has barely moved in 20 years.

Compare this with the US (around 3%), China (about 2.5%), and countries such as South Korea and Israel, which invest close to 5% of GDP. The results are visible. India has not emerged as a global product or innovation powerhouse. Outside of space technology, where sustained public investment paid dividends, cutting-edge capability remains limited.

A minerals sector that never took off

A similar story plays out in mining. India’s geology is comparable to Australia’s, yet only 25–30% of its geological potential has been explored. The country is overwhelmingly import-dependent — 90% for oil and gas, nearly 100% for gold and lithium, 95% for copper ore, and even significant volumes of coal and bauxite.

Mining contributes just 2% to India’s GDP, compared to 8–10% in countries with similar geological endowments. Policy attention has focused more on allocation mechanisms and government revenue than on discovery and exploration — leaving vast mineral wealth untouched underground.

Why policy design matters more than intent

Exploration is risky and capital-intensive. The government cannot shoulder this burden alone. Private investment will come only if firms are allowed to freely monetise discoveries without constant intervention. Without such reforms, India will remain a consumer — not a supplier — in global mineral supply chains.

In a world where control over lithium, rare earths and copper increasingly defines strategic power, this is a critical vulnerability.

The ‘third way’: India’s market as leverage

There is, in theory, a third option for India to claim relevance — its market. India’s vast consumer base is its strongest card in a transactional world. Opening it more decisively could attract strategic interest, even from a hard-nosed negotiator like Trump.

Yet domestic political economy complicates this path. India’s instinctive policy response has been caution and protectionism. The prolonged and cautious trade negotiations with the US reflect this reluctance to use market access as a strategic bargaining tool.

Potential versus performance in today’s geopolitics

For years, India has relied on its “potential” — as a future economic heavyweight and geopolitical counterweight to China — to earn a place at the global high table. That potential remains real. But contemporary geopolitics is unforgiving. It rewards delivery, not promise.

“Pax Silica” reflects a world driven by actual capabilities in technology, energy and minerals. India’s exclusion is less a diplomatic slight and more a mirror — reflecting gaps created by decades of underinvestment and policy hesitation.

Can India shorten the wait?

India’s moment will come — but only if urgency replaces complacency. Greater investment in R&D, serious reform of mineral exploration policy, and a clearer strategy on market access could accelerate its arrival.

In today’s great power politics, seats are not reserved on goodwill. They are earned through what countries can supply — now, not later.