Why Bangladeshi Migrant Workers in the Middle East Have Largely Stayed Away from Jihadist Groups — and Why That May Be Changing

Despite being one of the largest expatriate communities in the Middle East, Bangladeshi migrant workers have historically shown remarkably low participation in transnational jihadist movements. This anomaly has long intrigued security analysts, especially given Bangladesh’s own encounters with violent extremism at home. However, recent political churn and ideological shifts within Bangladesh raise questions about whether this pattern will endure.

The scale and significance of the Bangladeshi diaspora

An estimated 5–7 million Bangladeshis work across Middle Eastern countries, making them the third-largest expatriate workforce in the region after Indians and Pakistanis. Unlike the Indian diaspora, which spans a wide occupational and socio-economic spectrum, Bangladeshi migrants are overwhelmingly concentrated in low-wage sectors — construction, transport, factories, domestic work, cleaning, and security.

Yet their economic contribution back home is outsized. Annual remittances of around $25 billion — roughly 6–7% of Bangladesh’s GDP — exceed export earnings and play a crucial role in stabilising foreign exchange reserves, supporting domestic consumption, and sustaining economic growth. This deep material stake in stability has historically shaped the worldview of Bangladeshi migrant workers.

An unexpected pattern: low radicalisation abroad

Given regional turmoil and the active presence of extremist groups in the Middle East, Bangladeshi migrants — often with limited means and social protection — might appear vulnerable to recruitment. Counterintuitively, proven cases of Bangladeshis joining groups such as “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” or “Al-Qaeda” remain strikingly low, estimated at only 30–40 individuals.

This contrasts sharply with countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, which have far smaller expatriate populations in the Middle East but have contributed several hundred fighters. Even more stark is the comparison with ethnic groups from the Russian Caucasus — Chechens, Dagestanis, and Ingush — who together account for thousands of foreign fighters.

Domestic extremism without mass overseas spillover

This restraint is notable given Bangladesh’s own history with extremist organisations. Groups such as Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) have carried out bombings and targeted killings, most infamously the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka that killed 22 people, mostly foreigners.

Yet even at home, hardline Islamist parties and movements have struggled to gain mass electoral traction. Political outfits like Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh and other religious parties have rarely crossed the 10% vote-share mark, peaking briefly in the early 1990s before declining steadily. This limited societal penetration helps explain why Bangladeshi migrants have not carried deep reservoirs of ideological grievance abroad.

Cultural identity and the Bengali exception

Analysts often point to Bangladesh’s foundational identity as a key factor. The country emerged in 1971 by rejecting the “Two-Nation Theory” that prioritised religion over language and culture. Bengali identity — rooted in linguistic pride, artistic traditions, and social pluralism — has historically outweighed pan-Islamist narratives.

This cultural orientation has translated into relatively high social cohesion, inclusivity, and what many describe as an inherent humanism. In the Gulf, Bangladeshis are often perceived as reliable and non-confrontational workers, particularly in domestic employment — a perception that contrasts with stereotypes attached to other South Asian communities. Such social capital has likely reduced alienation, a key driver of radicalisation.

The political turn at home and why it matters abroad

What makes the current moment different is the rapid shift in Bangladesh’s domestic political and ideological landscape. Surveys by the “International Republican Institute” indicate a sharp rise — up to 30% — in popular preference for hardline Islamist parties. When combined with smaller religious outfits, this bloc could command over a third of the vote, overtaking even the “Bangladesh Nationalist Party”.

Meanwhile, estimates suggest the “Awami League”, led by Sheikh Hasina and long seen as a bulwark against religious extremism, has suffered a dramatic erosion of support. For over 16 years, her government — despite its authoritarian excesses — systematically suppressed extremist networks. That restraining influence has now weakened.

From domestic flux to global consequences

The irony is that recent student protests were not driven by religious demands but by opposition to authoritarian governance. Yet religious forces have emerged as key beneficiaries of the political churn, including under the interim caretaker dispensation led by Muhammad Yunus. This reconfiguration risks reshaping Bangladesh’s ideological compass.

Domestic polarisation, electoral tensions ahead of the February general elections, and a growing legitimisation of hardline narratives are likely to affect how Bangladeshi migrants are perceived — and how they perceive themselves — abroad. Changes in identity formation at home can travel with migrant communities, altering previously resilient patterns.

Why the old assumptions may no longer hold

Historically, economic pragmatism, cultural pluralism, and limited domestic radicalisation insulated Bangladeshi migrant workers from jihadist recruitment despite their vulnerability. But as Bangladesh’s political centre of gravity shifts, those protective buffers may weaken.

The concern is not that Bangladeshis will suddenly mirror the trajectories of other radicalised diasporas, but that a once-exceptional case may begin to converge with global patterns of ideological spillover. In that sense, the question is no longer why Bangladeshis stayed away from extremist groups — but whether the conditions that enabled that restraint are now eroding.