Why Are Tensions Rising Between Saudi Arabia and the UAE Amid the Yemen Conflict?
For years, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were seen as the twin pillars of Gulf security, fighting shoulder to shoulder in Yemen against the Iran-backed Houthis. That perception fractured dramatically at the end of December 2025, when Saudi airstrikes hit Yemen’s southern port city of Mukalla — not against the Houthis, but against forces linked to the UAE. The episode has exposed deep and long-simmering divergences between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi over Yemen’s future and the balance of power in the Arabian Peninsula.
The Mukalla airstrikes and the immediate fallout
The crisis erupted on December 30, when Saudi forces carried out airstrikes on Mukalla port, claiming they had targeted weapons shipments bound for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a powerful southern Yemeni separatist group backed by the UAE. Saudi military spokesman Brigadier General Turki al-Malki said the vessels — allegedly arriving from Fujairah in the UAE — had disabled tracking systems and unloaded arms and military vehicles.
The UAE swiftly rejected these claims, insisting the shipment contained no weapons and that Saudi Arabia had prior knowledge of its arrival. Within hours, Abu Dhabi announced it would withdraw its remaining forces from Yemen, citing concerns for the safety and effectiveness of its counterterrorism mission. What had been a proxy-level rivalry suddenly spilled into open confrontation.
The Southern Transitional Council at the heart of the dispute
At the centre of the Saudi–UAE rift lies the “Southern Transitional Council”. Formed in 2017, the STC seeks to restore an independent South Yemen, which existed as a separate state until unification in 1990. Backed militarily and politically by the UAE, the STC has emerged as the dominant force across much of southern Yemen, controlling Aden and other strategic areas.
Saudi Arabia, by contrast, supports Yemen’s internationally recognised Presidential Leadership Council, which nominally governs the country but has steadily lost authority in the south. Riyadh views the STC’s expansion not just as a challenge to Yemeni unity, but as a direct threat to Saudi influence along its southern border.
Why Hadramout matters so much to Saudi Arabia
The recent escalation is closely tied to events in Hadramout, Yemen’s largest and resource-rich province. The STC’s push into Hadramout — including its takeover of major facilities such as PetroMasila, Yemen’s largest oil company — alarmed Saudi policymakers. Control over Hadramout offers access to oil revenues, strategic depth, and a coastline that could shape future trade and security arrangements in the Arabian Sea.
As analyst Farea al-Muslimi has noted, losing Hadramout would be a strategic nightmare for Riyadh. It would leave Saudi Arabia facing a UAE-aligned political entity controlling territory abutting its border and commanding vital energy assets.
Diverging endgames in Yemen
Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE entered the Yemen war together in 2015, their objectives have diverged over time. Riyadh’s priority remains preventing a hostile entity — especially the “Houthis” — from threatening its borders and projecting Iranian influence into the kingdom. Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, has focused on securing ports, shipping lanes, and counterterrorism objectives, particularly against Islamist groups, while cultivating loyal local partners such as the STC.
These competing strategies have turned former allies into rivals operating on the same battlefield, often backing opposing Yemeni factions under the same anti-Houthi umbrella.
From proxy rivalry to open confrontation
Analysts see the Mukalla strikes as a turning point. After years of indirect competition through local actors, Saudi Arabia publicly accused the UAE of actions that threaten its national security. Such language marks a sharp escalation and evokes memories of the 2017 Gulf crisis, when Saudi Arabia and the UAE jointly isolated Qatar — a move that destabilised regional politics for years.
The symbolism of Saudi jets striking targets linked to a “brotherly” Gulf state underscores how fragile the Saudi–UAE partnership has become.
How the Houthis stand to benefit
Ironically, the biggest beneficiary of the Saudi–UAE rift may be the Houthis. Having survived years of coalition pressure, they now watch as their two principal adversaries turn against each other. The erosion of coordination within the anti-Houthi camp weakens prospects for a unified political settlement and strengthens the Houthis’ hand both militarily and diplomatically.
What could happen next?
The UAE’s decision to pull out its remaining forces suggests a recalibration rather than a complete retreat from Yemeni politics. Abu Dhabi is likely to continue backing the STC through local partners, while Saudi Arabia may double down on supporting the Presidential Council and securing Hadramout.
What is clear is that Yemen is no longer just a battleground between a Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis. It has become an arena where Gulf rivals are openly contesting influence. As tensions rise, the risk is that Yemen’s already fractured conflict could slide into a new and more dangerous phase — one shaped less by ideology and more by regional power rivalry.