What the US Operation in Venezuela Reveals About Power, Oil and the Breakdown of Global Order

What the US Operation in Venezuela Reveals About Power, Oil and the Breakdown of Global Order

The dramatic US military operation in Venezuela — culminating in the capture of President “Nicolás Maduro” — was not merely a show of force against a weaker adversary. It was a signal of how military dominance, energy geopolitics and electoral politics are increasingly intertwined in a world where the constraints of a rules-based order appear to be eroding.

A demonstration of overwhelming military-technological superiority

The operation, conducted in the early hours of January 3, showcased the full spectrum of US military power. Around 150 aircraft — fighter jets, drones and helicopters — operated seamlessly across air and sea, supported by satellite surveillance, cyber capabilities and electronic warfare. Venezuelan radar systems were neutralised, communications disrupted, and even power supply to Caracas was reportedly shut down.

This level of integration highlights why the United States, which spends close to $1 trillion annually on defence, retains unmatched operational reach. Technology, rather than troop numbers, proved decisive. The Venezuelan armed forces were effectively paralysed before any meaningful resistance could materialise.

Questions over rival defence systems

The ease with which Venezuelan air defences were bypassed has also raised uncomfortable questions about Chinese-supplied systems deployed in Caracas. These doubts were already circulating after Chinese air defence platforms reportedly failed to deter Indian strikes during “Operation Sindoor” against Pakistan.

For countries relying on imported defence technology, Venezuela’s experience underlines a harsh reality: systems that look formidable on paper may not withstand a technologically superior adversary.

Domestic politics and the calculus of approval

Military success abroad has often translated into political dividends at home. The contrast with past US interventions is telling. The 1989 invasion of Panama took weeks to capture Manuel Noriega and resulted in significant American casualties. By contrast, the Venezuela operation was swift, decisive, and cost no American lives.

President “Donald Trump”, facing elections later in the year with approval ratings hovering between 40% and 45%, had clear incentives to project strength. Prior to the operation, public support for military action against drug trafficking in the Caribbean was limited. A quick, “successful” operation helps reframe that narrative, particularly with all seats in the US House of Representatives and a third of the Senate at stake.

Oil, not drugs, at the heart of the intervention

While the operation was justified on grounds of narco-terrorism, few analysts believe drugs were the primary motivation. Venezuela is not a major source of narcotics for the US. What it does possess is the world’s largest proven oil reserves — about 303 billion barrels, surpassing even Saudi Arabia.

Trump’s post-operation statements removed any lingering ambiguity. He openly announced that major US oil companies would enter Venezuela, repair infrastructure and ramp up production. Control over Venezuelan oil would give the US influence over nearly 30% of global reserves, a staggering concentration of energy power.

The economic and environmental contradictions

Venezuelan crude is extra-heavy, expensive to extract, and among the most polluting forms of oil. In a world struggling to limit global warming, accelerating production of such oil sits uneasily with climate commitments.

Lower oil prices — potentially pushed below $50 a barrel — could stimulate consumption and slow the transition to renewable energy worldwide. This runs counter to global climate goals, but aligns with short-term economic and electoral incentives.

The scale of investment required

Reviving Venezuela’s oil sector will not be cheap. According to Energy Aspects, years of underinvestment, decaying infrastructure and power shortages have crippled production. Adding even 500,000 barrels per day would cost around $10 billion and take two years. Restoring peak capacity of 3.5 million barrels per day would require sustained investment of roughly $100 billion over a decade.

Such capital intensity effectively limits participation to a handful of large US firms — reinforcing the likelihood that companies from other countries will be sidelined.

India’s stranded interests in Venezuela

India is among those likely to lose out. Once a major processor of Venezuelan heavy crude, importing up to 400,000 barrels per day, India was forced to halt imports after sweeping US sanctions in 2020.

India’s overseas arm, “ONGC Videsh Limited”, operated the San Cristobal oilfield and holds stakes in other Venezuelan assets. Caracas reportedly owes OVL nearly $1 billion in unpaid dues and dividends. While easing sanctions could, in theory, allow OVL to resume operations, Trump’s explicit intention to hand Venezuelan oil to US companies makes such a return uncertain without Washington’s approval.

The Monroe Doctrine revived — and weaponised

Trump’s explicit endorsement of the “Monroe Doctrine” marks a return to overt spheres-of-influence thinking. His assertion that “American dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never be questioned again” signals a willingness to bypass multilateral norms.

This posture has unsettled governments across Latin America and beyond. Colombia’s President “Gustavo Petro” has warned of defending national sovereignty, while Cuba’s “Miguel Díaz-Canel” has voiced solidarity with Venezuela. Even Denmark has reacted sharply, with its Prime Minister warning that any US attempt to seize Greenland would fracture NATO.

A world drifting away from rules

The Venezuela episode underscores a broader shift: power increasingly exercised through unilateral force rather than international consensus. When military might, energy control and domestic politics converge, the space for diplomacy and law narrows.

From Latin America to Iran, uncertainty now prevails. In the absence of a credible, rules-based global order, smaller states face heightened vulnerability — and major powers appear increasingly willing to act first and justify later.

Originally written on January 14, 2026 and last modified on January 14, 2026.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *