Paris Agreement at 10: Why developing countries are questioning the world’s climate compact
A decade after it came into force, the Paris Agreement is facing an unusual moment of introspection. Unlike its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, it is not under immediate threat of collapse. Yet questions about its effectiveness, fairness and long-term relevance are growing louder, particularly among developing countries. As the treaty completed ten years in November, the global climate conversation began to shift — from unquestioned acceptance of its architecture to open debate about whether it can still deliver meaningful results.
Why dissatisfaction with the Paris Agreement is growing
The unease did not begin with the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in early 2025, though that move reinforced doubts about global cooperation. For several developing countries, frustration has been building over a deeper imbalance. The treaty places binding procedural obligations on them — such as mandatory climate action plans and detailed greenhouse gas inventories — while failing to deliver the finance and technology support that were repeatedly promised.
At the same time, Paris-era climate norms increasingly constrain energy, industrial and economic policy choices in poorer countries. This has sharpened the sense that the costs of climate action are being socialised globally, while the benefits and historical responsibility remain unevenly distributed.
COP30 and the changing power balance in climate talks
This shift became visible at COP30 in Belém, Brazil. Developing countries, led by large emerging economies such as India, China, Saudi Arabia and Brazil, successfully pushed two long-standing demands into the final outcome document. They also blocked language on fossil fuel phase-out that the European Union and a group of developed countries had sought to advance.
The outcome underlined a new reality: in the absence of the US, large developing countries can decisively shape negotiations. China emerged as the most influential actor at COP30. As the world’s largest emitter and a country preparing to cut emissions, it is increasingly seen as capable of filling part of the leadership vacuum left by Washington.
The mitigation-heavy design of the Paris framework
At its core, the Paris Agreement is built around mitigation. It seeks to keep global temperature rise well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, preferably limiting it to 1.5°C. Since rising temperatures are driven by greenhouse gas emissions, the treaty focuses on reducing emissions across all countries.
The agreement does recognise that nations have different responsibilities and capabilities, allowing them to choose their own pace and trajectory. But its underlying assumption is that collective voluntary action by all countries will be sufficient to avert dangerous warming — an assumption that the past decade has not borne out. The world remains far off track from meeting its 2030 emissions goals.
How Paris replaced Kyoto — and why that matters
This design was not accidental. The 1994 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol were grounded in the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). They identified a limited group of developed countries as primarily responsible for historical emissions and assigned them binding emission-reduction targets.
Developed nations, including the US, soon resisted this model. After undermining Kyoto — which Washington never ratified — they pushed for the Paris Agreement, where binding targets were replaced with nationally determined contributions for all. What had once been a clearly assigned obligation became a shared, voluntary responsibility.
The result, critics argue, is predictable: when everyone is responsible, no one is accountable.
What Paris has achieved — and where it falls short
It would be inaccurate to say the Paris Agreement has delivered nothing. It has catalysed thousands of climate actions by governments, corporations, cities and non-state actors, producing real though limited gains. However, these actions are insufficient to meet the treaty’s temperature goals.
This gap has triggered calls for course correction. India was among the first to articulate this openly. In 2024, it argued that treating temperature targets as the sole organising principle of climate policy was flawed. According to India, economic development and prosperity are themselves critical tools for climate resilience, especially in poorer societies.
Why adaptation is moving to the centre of the debate
India has consistently argued that adaptation deserves equal priority with mitigation. For countries with low per capita incomes and large populations, rapid development inevitably raises emissions in the short term. Yet not pursuing development leaves societies more exposed to climate shocks.
This argument has gained traction, particularly as climate-linked trade measures like the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) begin to penalise exports from developing countries. India has called it morally wrong to impose identical emission standards on vastly unequal economies — a view recently echoed by Bill Gates, who argued that poverty reduction, health, sanitation and early warning systems may deliver stronger climate outcomes than emission cuts alone.
The China pathway and the search for alternatives
At the heart of the debate is the demand for policy freedom. Countries like India want the flexibility to choose climate pathways suited to their circumstances. China offers a compelling example. Still classified as a developing country, China saw its emissions quadruple since the mid-1990s even as it built the world’s largest renewable energy capacity and became one of the most electrified major economies.
Now, China has announced plans to begin cutting emissions by 7–10% from peak levels. Given its clean energy scale, it could decarbonise faster than many developed countries and potentially reach net zero ahead of them — despite setting a later target year of 2060. If so, China would have met both development and climate goals outside the strict mitigation-first logic of the Paris Agreement.
What the next phase of climate politics may look like
Not every country can replicate China’s scale or resources. But the broader principle is gaining acceptance: climate action cannot follow a single template. As developing countries push back against constraints they see as inequitable, the Paris Agreement is likely to remain in force — but with its authority and centrality increasingly contested.
The coming years may see climate cooperation shift away from rigid global prescriptions toward looser frameworks that allow diverse national pathways. Whether this leads to more effective action or deeper fragmentation will define the next chapter of global climate governance.