Mohammad Najibullah

Mohammad Najibullah

Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai was an Afghan military officer, intelligence chief, and politician who served as the second president of Afghanistan from 1987 until 1992. A leading member of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), he presided over the final phase of the Afghan communist government during the Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent civil war. His life and political career reflect the turbulence of Afghanistan’s late twentieth-century history, marked by ideological conflict, foreign intervention, and internal fragmentation.

Early Life and Political Beginnings

Najibullah was born on 6 August 1947 in Gardez, Paktia Province, into the Ahmadzai branch of the Ghilji Pashtun tribe. He received his early education at Habibia High School in Kabul, later studying in Baramulla in India before entering Kabul University in 1964. Although he completed a medical degree, he never practised medicine. Instead, he became politically active as a student and joined the Parcham faction of the PDPA in 1965. His activism led to two periods of imprisonment. During this time, he also served closely alongside Babrak Karmal, a prominent Parcham leader.
By the late 1970s, Najibullah had gained a position within the party’s Central Committee. When the PDPA seized power during the Saur Revolution of April 1978, he was appointed to the Revolutionary Council. However, the Khalq faction—rivals of the Parcham wing—soon dominated the new government. Najibullah was removed from his post, appointed briefly as ambassador to Iran, and eventually forced into exile in Europe.

Rise Under the Karmal Government

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 ousted the Khalq leadership and installed a Parcham-dominated administration under Babrak Karmal. Najibullah returned to Afghanistan and quickly became a key figure in the restructured government. In 1980 he was made head of KHAD, the state intelligence and security agency. Under his leadership, KHAD developed into one of the most powerful and feared state institutions, responsible for counter-insurgency, surveillance, and political repression. The agency’s size expanded dramatically, and its personnel enjoyed high status and strong Soviet support.
Najibullah’s effectiveness in overseeing KHAD operations earned him political influence. He maintained direct links with senior Soviet officials and was appointed to the PDPA Politburo in 1981. By the mid-1980s, he had established himself as one of the most prominent Parcham politicians in Kabul.

Assumption of Power, 1985–1986

In November 1985 Najibullah was appointed to senior leadership posts within the PDPA Secretariat. As the Soviet Union sought a pathway out of the Afghan conflict, the question of political succession became pressing. General Secretary Babrak Karmal faced increasing pressure to resign, largely due to Soviet dissatisfaction with his leadership and ineffective governance.
Supported by Mikhail Gorbachev and influential Soviet advisers, Najibullah emerged as the preferred successor. In 1986, after months of negotiation and internal struggle, he replaced Karmal as PDPA General Secretary. Although Karmal initially attempted to retain the presidency, Najibullah eventually consolidated authority through a combination of political manoeuvring and party restructuring.

Presidency and National Reconciliation

Najibullah assumed the presidency in 1987, leading Afghanistan during a period of profound transition. His administration launched a policy termed National Reconciliation, which aimed to end the ongoing civil war by widening political participation and reducing the ideological rigidity of the state. Key aspects included:

  • distancing the government from Marxist–Leninist doctrine
  • abolishing the one-party system
  • inviting non-communists into government positions
  • restoring greater prominence to Islam, including declaring it the official state religion
  • encouraging exiled Afghan businessmen to return and reclaim property

A new constitution in 1990 removed references to communism, signalling a shift toward Afghan nationalism. Despite these reforms, mistrust of the government remained widespread, and many opposition groups rejected reconciliation efforts.
Throughout Najibullah’s presidency, the Soviet Union—despite its military withdrawal completed by 1989—continued to provide economic and military assistance. Meanwhile, Pakistan, the United States, and other external actors supported various mujahideen factions, ensuring the continuation of armed conflict.

Collapse of the Government, 1991–1992

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in late 1991 deprived Najibullah of his most vital external support. Without Soviet aid, the Afghan state rapidly weakened. Defections among military leaders, most notably that of General Abdul Rashid Dostum, accelerated the government’s collapse. Najibullah resigned in April 1992 as mujahideen forces entered Kabul.
Attempts to flee to India failed, leaving him to seek refuge in the United Nations compound in Kabul, where he remained for several years while different factions fought for control of the capital.

Assassination and Legacy

When the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996, Najibullah was seized from the UN compound, tortured, and killed along with his brother. His death symbolised the violent upheaval that characterised Afghanistan during the 1990s.
In later years, perceptions of Najibullah have shifted. While criticised for his role in political repression as KHAD chief and for presiding over a deteriorating state, some Afghans remember him as a nationalist leader who attempted to stabilise the country and pursue reconciliation. In 2017, the Watan Party was founded as a political successor to the old PDPA’s Parcham faction and as a tribute to his political legacy.
Mohammad Najibullah’s life encapsulates a turbulent era of Afghan history shaped by ideological conflict, superpower involvement, and the struggle to maintain national unity amid profound internal divisions.

Originally written on June 4, 2018 and last modified on November 21, 2025.

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