Israel Recognises Somaliland: Why Beijing Faces Its Sharpest Strategic Test in the Horn of Africa
Israel’s decision in December 2025 to recognise Somaliland as an independent sovereign state has redrawn diplomatic fault lines in the Horn of Africa. While attention has largely focused on Israel’s maritime interests and regional reactions from West Asia and Türkiye, the most profound strategic dilemma triggered by this move lies elsewhere — in Beijing. For China, Somaliland’s recognition strikes at the heart of its core doctrines on sovereignty, regional security, and great-power competition.
Why Israel’s move is a rupture, not just a recognition
Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991, has functioned as a de facto state for over three decades, with its own institutions, elections, currency and security apparatus. Yet, until now, it has lacked formal international recognition. Israel’s decision is therefore not symbolic — it marks the first recognition by a major non-African power, potentially opening the door to wider diplomatic acceptance.
This matters because the Horn of Africa is already an arena of intense geopolitical rivalry. Any shift in status here risks reviving proxy competition, heightening militarisation along the Red Sea corridor, and reshaping control over one of the world’s most critical maritime choke points.
China’s dilemma: sovereignty, security and competition collide
China’s response has been swift and predictable. Beijing condemned Israel’s move, reiterating that Somaliland is an “inseparable part” of “Somalia”. At one level, this aligns with China’s rigid defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity — principles deeply intertwined with its domestic concerns over “Taiwan”.
But Somaliland complicates this worldview. Unlike many separatist territories, it has sustained peace, democratic processes and governance for over 30 years, standing in stark contrast to Somalia’s chronic instability. While China officially rejects internal legitimacy as a basis for statehood, Somaliland exposes the limits of this absolutist doctrine.
The Taiwan factor: an outlier China cannot ignore
Beijing’s discomfort is sharpened by Somaliland’s 2020 decision to establish official ties with Taipei. Taiwan’s representative office in Hargeisa and growing cooperation in health, technology and education have made Somaliland a rare African partner of Taiwan — alongside “Eswatini”.
For China, which has invested decades in diplomatically isolating Taiwan, Somaliland represents a breach in Africa’s otherwise near-total adherence to the “One China” policy. Israel’s recognition risks amplifying Somaliland’s international profile, indirectly legitimising Taiwan’s presence and undermining Beijing’s diplomatic red lines.
Why the Bab el-Mandeb makes Somaliland strategically sensitive
Ideology alone does not explain China’s anxiety. Somaliland’s geography places it close to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait — the narrow gateway linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This corridor is central to China’s trade and energy flows under the Maritime Silk Road, which Beijing has repeatedly described as a “jugular vein” of global commerce.
China’s first overseas military base, established in “Djibouti” in 2017, was built precisely to secure this route. If Somaliland gains wider recognition and emerges as an alternative logistics or security hub — potentially backed by Israel, the “United Arab Emirates”, or even the United States — it could dilute China’s influence in a region where it has invested heavily in ports, bases and political ties.
Beijing’s strategic trade-off: pressure or pragmatism?
China now faces an uncomfortable balancing act. It must oppose Somaliland’s recognition to safeguard the One China principle and block Taiwan’s diplomatic expansion. Yet, excessive coercion risks pushing Hargeisa deeper into the orbit of China’s rivals.
Heavy-handed economic pressure or overt political interference would also damage Beijing’s carefully cultivated image as a non-interfering development partner in Africa. Instead, China is likely to rely on subtler tools: diplomatic obstruction, elite lobbying, and information campaigns. Chinese media networks such as StarTimes — operational across much of Africa — offer ready platforms to shape narratives around territorial integrity and external interference.
At multilateral forums, Beijing can also use its veto power at the “United Nations Security Council” to block any momentum towards Somaliland’s broader recognition.
Israel, Palestine and China’s Middle East calculus
China’s increasingly vocal pro-Palestinian stance adds another layer to the dilemma. By criticising Israel’s actions in Gaza and positioning itself as a defender of Palestinian rights, Beijing reinforces its opposition to Israel’s Somaliland move. While this posture resonates with Arab and Global South audiences, it also risks entangling China more deeply in Middle Eastern politics — complicating its traditionally pragmatic neutrality.
A shifting regional chessboard
The broader context makes Beijing’s challenge sharper still. Ethiopia’s 2024 memorandum of understanding to recognise Somaliland in exchange for port access, rising interest in the US Congress in Somaliland as a strategic partner, and tacit backing from the UAE suggest that Israel’s move could catalyse a wider geopolitical recalibration.
Each additional recognition would weaken China’s ability to diplomatically isolate Somaliland, raising the strategic costs of defending the status quo.
Why Somaliland is no longer a footnote
Ultimately, China’s task is not merely to block Somaliland’s recognition. It is to prevent expanded Taiwanese visibility, deeper Israeli and western access to the Red Sea, and the emergence of a rival security architecture near Djibouti.
Israel’s decision has thrust Somaliland into the centre of great-power competition in the Horn of Africa. In doing so, it has exposed the tension between Beijing’s principles and its pragmatism — and revealed the limits of China’s sovereignty-first approach in a region that is rapidly becoming indispensable to global trade and geopolitics.