Iran on the Brink? Why the Current Protests Pose the Regime’s Toughest Test Since 1979

Iran is once again witnessing mass protests — but this time, the pressure on the Islamic Republic appears deeper and more structural than in previous uprisings. Driven by economic collapse, rising repression, and sharpened external pressure, the ongoing unrest represents the most serious challenge to the regime since its birth in 1979. Yet, history suggests that the fall of a regime in Iran depends less on street anger and more on the loyalties of the gun.

Why Iran is witnessing another wave of protests

Protests are not new to Iran. The 2009 Green Movement questioned electoral legitimacy. The 2019 unrest erupted over fuel prices. The 2022–23 uprising followed the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody for allegedly violating hijab rules, leaving more than 500 dead.

The current protests, however, are rooted in economic despair. The Iranian rial has collapsed, food inflation has crossed 70%, and unemployment continues to rise. Years of U.S.-led sanctions on oil exports have depleted foreign exchange reserves, while the recent 12-day conflict involving Israel and the United States has further strained public finances through higher taxation and disrupted trade.

Unlike earlier protests driven largely by political or social freedoms, this phase directly attacks the regime’s ability to provide economic survival — historically the most dangerous trigger for authoritarian systems.

The human cost and the fog of information

Reliable casualty figures are hard to obtain in Iran’s tightly controlled media environment. Independent estimates suggest that more than 5,000 people may have been killed so far, with thousands injured or detained. Internet blackouts, arrests of journalists, and intimidation of families have limited verification.

The scale of repression underscores the regime’s fear: it sees this unrest not as episodic dissent, but as a potential threat to its continuity.

The exiled Shah’s heir and the regime-change narrative

Reza Pahlavi, son of the last Shah of Iran and living in exile in the United States, has urged protesters to seize cities and overthrow the Islamic Republic, promising a transition toward democracy. While his rhetoric resonates with sections of the Iranian diaspora, his influence inside Iran remains uncertain.

What is clear is that the regime views the protests through a regime-change lens — reinforced by overt encouragement from the U.S. and Israel. For President Donald Trump, hostility toward Tehran is deeply personal as well as strategic, rooted in Iran’s support for groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, and the enduring humiliation of the failed 1980 Operation Eagle Claw hostage rescue.

Washington’s dilemma: strike or stand back?

As protests intensified, Trump publicly urged Iranians to “take over your institutions,” while simultaneously moving U.S. naval and air assets closer to West Asia. Military strike options were reportedly presented — then abruptly shelved.

The hesitation reflects hard realities. Air strikes could damage Iran’s economy and regime infrastructure but are unlikely to trigger regime change. Worse, civilian casualties could turn public anger against the U.S., rallying nationalist support behind Tehran.

Regional actors — Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and even Israel — quietly urged restraint. Any Iranian retaliation could destabilise the region, threaten Gulf oil facilities, spike global energy prices, and derail fragile diplomatic tracks, including Gaza-related negotiations.

The central question: will Iran’s security forces crack?

History suggests regimes fall only when their coercive apparatus refuses to fire. Iran’s fate hinges on the loyalty of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and allied security units.

From Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak to Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, from Romania in 1989 to Bangladesh more recently, regimes collapsed only when the military fractured. There is no clear evidence of such a rupture in Iran yet. On the contrary, the IRGC remains deeply invested — economically and ideologically — in the survival of the system.

As long as the armed forces hold, Iran can endure economic misery, much like Venezuela or Cuba.

Why Gulf states quietly prefer the status quo

Paradoxically, many Gulf monarchies are uneasy about a regime change in Tehran. A revolutionary overthrow would revive fears of a second Arab Spring. Moreover, a pro-U.S. Iran would reduce the strategic importance of Gulf states to Washington.

There is also oil. Iran’s sanctions have kept global prices near $60 a barrel. A fully rehabilitated Iran — alongside Venezuela — could flood markets, pushing prices toward $40, devastating oil-dependent economies. Even U.S. shale producers worry, as many require prices above $60 to remain profitable.

The China–Russia angle

Iran’s isolation has benefited China, its main oil buyer at discounted rates. Regime change would choke this supply, weakening Beijing economically and strategically. It would also reduce Russian influence in West Asia.

From Washington’s perspective, this is tempting — but risky. Neither Russia nor China is likely to intervene militarily, yet both would adapt, potentially hardening rival blocs elsewhere, from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific.

Why the regime still stands — for now

Iran today sits at a dangerous crossroads: economic collapse, public anger, and external pressure converging at once. But revolutions do not succeed on anger alone. Without a break in the military’s loyalty, the Islamic Republic can repress, endure and wait out the storm.

For Trump, every option carries costs. Military action could ignite a regional firestorm. Inaction could prolong instability. Regime change might weaken adversaries — but also destabilise energy markets and alliances.

The protests may yet reshape Iran’s future. But history suggests that unless the guns fall silent, the streets alone may not be enough.