India’s Critical Minerals Diplomacy: What Its Global Partnerships Have Delivered—and What Needs Fixing

India’s clean energy transition—from electric vehicles and batteries to renewables and grid-scale storage—rests on minerals it largely does not produce at home. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earth elements and copper are today as strategic as oil once was. With China tightening export controls and dominating processing chains, India’s dependence has become a strategic vulnerability. Over the last five years, New Delhi has responded by stitching together a web of bilateral and multilateral partnerships across continents, while also updating domestic mineral policies. The real question now is whether these engagements are translating into security on the ground—or whether India needs to rethink how it pursues critical minerals.

Why critical minerals have become a strategic imperative

India’s climate goals, industrial ambitions and digital economy all converge on access to critical minerals. Electric mobility, renewable energy storage, defence electronics and semiconductors depend on inputs that India mostly imports. Unlike fossil fuels, these minerals are embedded deep in global value chains, where extraction, refining and manufacturing are often controlled by different countries.

China’s dominance—especially in rare earth processing—has underscored the risks of over-dependence. As export controls tighten, India’s response has mirrored that of other major economies: diversify suppliers, secure overseas assets, and build domestic capability in processing and recycling.

Australia and Japan: the most substantive partnerships

Among India’s partners, Australia stands out as the most reliable. Political stability, abundant reserves and strategic alignment have allowed cooperation to move beyond statements. Under the India–Australia Critical Minerals Investment Partnership, five lithium and cobalt projects were identified in 2022 for potential investment, alongside joint research and long-term supply discussions.

Japan offers a different but equally valuable model. After China restricted rare earth exports to Tokyo in 2010, Japan responded with diversification, stockpiling, recycling and sustained R&D. India’s cooperation with Japan—building on ties with Indian Rare Earths Limited—has expanded into joint extraction, processing and even stockpiling, both bilaterally and in third countries. This institutional, long-horizon approach offers lessons for India’s own strategy.

Africa: opportunity with conditions

Africa is central to India’s upstream ambitions. The continent combines mineral abundance with growing demands for local value creation. India’s recent agreements with Namibia for lithium, rare earths and uranium, and asset-acquisition talks in Zambia for copper and cobalt, signal a renewed push.

However, competition is intense. China and Western majors operate with coordinated finance, diplomacy and technology. For India, transactional extraction deals will not suffice. Long-term industrial partnerships—local processing, skills development and infrastructure—are essential if New Delhi is to secure durable access.

The United States and Europe: technology-rich but complex

Despite political enthusiasm around “friend-shoring,” cooperation with the United States has struggled to move beyond dialogue. Shifting trade rules, recent American tariffs on Indian goods, and restrictive incentives under the Inflation Reduction Act complicate trust and predictability. Initiatives such as the TRUST Initiative and the Strategic Minerals Recovery Initiative propose cooperation on rare earth processing and battery recycling, but delivery remains uncertain.

The European Union presents a more structured opportunity. Its Critical Raw Materials Act, European Battery Alliance and circular economy agenda integrate regulation, sustainability and industrial strategy. For India, deeper engagement will require alignment with EU standards on transparency, lifecycle assessment and environmental norms—an adjustment that could also strengthen India’s domestic mining framework.

West Asia, Russia and new frontiers in Latin America

West Asia’s role is emerging rather than settled. Countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are investing heavily in refining, battery materials and green hydrogen, often via sovereign wealth funds acquiring mining assets abroad. For India, the Gulf could become a key midstream partner, processing minerals sourced from Africa or Latin America—though institutional depth is still limited.

Russia holds significant reserves of rare earths, cobalt and lithium, and scientific ties with India are longstanding. Yet sanctions, financing constraints and logistical uncertainty make Russia more of a hedge than a foundation.

Latin America—Argentina, Chile, Peru and Brazil—has become India’s newest frontier. These countries are central to global copper, lithium and nickel strategies. India has begun investing, including through Khanij Bidesh India Limited, which signed a ₹200 crore exploration and development agreement with Argentina. Still, engagement remains early-stage, and competition is fierce. Without local processing and value-chain partnerships, India risks being marginalised.

What all partnerships reveal: processing is the real choke point

Across regions, one lesson is clear: securing ore alone is insufficient. The strategic choke point lies in refining, separation and processing—areas where China dominates. Without domestic midstream capacity, India remains exposed even if it acquires overseas mines.

An effective division of labour is emerging in India’s approach: Africa, Australia, Canada and Latin America for upstream extraction; Japan and West Asia for midstream processing; the EU and the U.S. for downstream technologies such as batteries and recycling; and Russia as a diversification option. But this vision needs sharper execution and clearer prioritisation.

Why domestic reforms will decide global success

None of these partnerships will deliver lasting security unless India strengthens its domestic framework. Responsible mining, ESG compliance, transparency and regulatory certainty are increasingly non-negotiable in international cooperation. Without credible domestic standards and processing capacity, India’s global engagements risk remaining announcements rather than assets.

India has built an impressive diplomatic web around critical minerals. The next phase demands hard choices: deepen what works, recalibrate what does not, and focus relentlessly on technology, processing and long-term certainty. In the minerals race, strategy—not scale of announcements—will determine who stays secure.