Explained: The SHANTI Bill and the Big Shift in India’s Nuclear Power Policy

Parliament’s passage of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy in India (SHANTI) Bill marks the most consequential overhaul of India’s nuclear power framework since Independence. By opening a sector that has remained firmly state-controlled since 1956 to private and foreign participation, the legislation signals the government’s intent to place nuclear energy at the heart of India’s long-term energy security strategy. Yet, the Bill has also triggered sharp Opposition criticism over safety, accountability and transparency.

Why the SHANTI Bill matters now

India’s push for the SHANTI Bill comes amid rising energy demand, persistent dependence on coal, and the limitations of renewable power in providing round-the-clock electricity. In the Union Budget, the government reinforced this direction by allocating ₹20,000 crore to the Nuclear Energy Mission, with a focus on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and advanced pressurised water reactors.

Until now, India’s nuclear sector has been governed by two restrictive laws — the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 — which effectively kept private and foreign players out. Stringent liability provisions, in particular, deterred global suppliers. The SHANTI Bill seeks to reverse this by creating a predictable investment and regulatory environment.

What exactly does the SHANTI Bill do?

At its core, the SHANTI Bill dismantles the monopoly of Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) over nuclear plant operations. For the first time, private Indian companies can apply for licences to build, own and operate nuclear power plants, either independently or through joint ventures.

The Bill permits up to 49% private participation, while the government retains 51% control over sensitive domains such as nuclear fuel production, heavy water manufacturing, radioactive waste management, safety systems, licensing and strategic oversight. Foreign suppliers are allowed to participate, though the law stops short of explicitly permitting foreign direct investment.

The model envisaged is essentially a public–private partnership, with private capital and expertise operating under tight state supervision.

Boosting advanced and modular nuclear technologies

A major policy objective of the SHANTI Bill is to facilitate new-generation nuclear technologies. By clarifying regulatory pathways and easing entry barriers, the Bill supports the deployment of SMRs and indigenous reactor designs.

SMRs, with capacities of around 150 MW, are seen as safer, quicker to deploy, and more suitable for distributed energy needs. The government argues that such technologies are crucial for meeting India’s clean energy targets while ensuring reliable baseload power — something solar and wind cannot guarantee on their own.

The strengthened role of the nuclear regulator

A key institutional change under the Bill is the elevation of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB). Constituted in 1983, the AERB now receives statutory backing and becomes answerable to Parliament rather than functioning solely under the executive.

The AERB is responsible for nuclear safety, radiation protection, emergency preparedness, licensing, inspections and quality assurance across civilian nuclear installations. With private participation expanding, the regulator’s role becomes central to maintaining safety and public confidence. Critics, however, argue that concentrating extensive powers in a single authority could weaken checks and balances.

What safeguards does the Bill claim to provide?

The government insists that national security and safety remain firmly under state control. The Bill mandates authorisation from the AERB for every stage of nuclear activity — from production and possession of radioactive material to plant operation and decommissioning.

Strategic functions such as reprocessing of spent fuel, enrichment, isotopic separation, heavy water production and high-level waste management remain exclusively with the government. The Bill also proposes a dedicated nuclear liability fund to meet compensation requirements in the event of an accident.

The biggest change: liability rules rewritten

The most controversial aspect of the SHANTI Bill is its overhaul of nuclear liability. Unlike the 2010 law, which allowed operators to seek recourse against suppliers, the new framework removes supplier liability altogether.

Instead, operator liability is capped:

• ₹3,000 crore for large plants (3,600 MW)
• ₹1,500 crore for medium plants (1,500–3,600 MW)
• ₹100 crore for SMRs (150 MW)

Penalties for severe violations are capped at ₹1 crore. Any liability beyond the operator’s cap will be borne by the Union government, supplemented by the nuclear liability fund. The government argues this clarity is essential to attract investment; critics see it as a dilution of accountability.

The government’s case for nuclear expansion

The Centre frames the SHANTI Bill as indispensable for India’s development trajectory. Nuclear power offers continuous baseload electricity, low carbon emissions, and reduced dependence on fossil fuel imports. It is projected as a key enabler of India’s net-zero target for 2070.

The Bill could also revive stalled civil nuclear cooperation with the U.S., France and Japan, reduce over-reliance on Russian reactors, and bolster India’s image as a responsible nuclear power.

India’s indigenous nuclear programme: what already exists

India currently operates 25 nuclear reactors across seven plants — mostly pressurised heavy water reactors — all run by NPCIL. The programme is largely indigenous, designed around India’s limited uranium but abundant thorium reserves.

Institutions such as the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre have developed reprocessing and waste-handling technologies, and India has operationalised fast breeder reactor systems as part of its long-term thorium cycle strategy. The Opposition argues this self-reliance weakens the case for foreign and private dependence.

Why the Opposition is pushing back hard

Opposition parties argue that the SHANTI Bill socialises risk while privatising profit. By capping operator liability and removing supplier accountability, they say the law undermines the “polluter pays” principle and could leave the public bearing the costs of catastrophic accidents.

References to Bhopal, Fukushima and Chernobyl feature prominently in the critique, with opponents noting that real-world damages in such disasters vastly exceeded liability caps. They also warn that the caps are not indexed to inflation or long-term health and environmental costs.

Concerns over transparency, labour rights and public oversight

Several provisions have drawn alarm beyond liability. Section 39 overrides parts of the RTI Act, 2005, classifying much nuclear-sector information as “restricted”, raising fears of reduced public accountability. Section 42 exempts nuclear facilities from general labour safety laws, removing nuclear workers from the broader occupational safety framework — a move opposed by multiple trade unions.

Critics also point to the absence of mandatory public hearings, environmental impact disclosures, community consent mechanisms or routine parliamentary scrutiny. France’s fully state-owned nuclear model is often cited as a counter-example.

A reform that redraws the nuclear social contract

The SHANTI Bill fundamentally alters India’s nuclear social contract — who builds reactors, who profits, and who bears the risk. For the government, it is a pragmatic step toward energy security and climate goals. For the Opposition, it is a vendor-driven, profit-oriented reform that compromises safety and democratic oversight.

Whether the Bill delivers a nuclear renaissance or triggers deeper public unease will depend not just on investment flows, but on how credibly safety, transparency and accountability are enforced in a sector where, as history shows, the costs of failure can be irreversible.