Delhi Riots Verdict Explained: Why the Supreme Court Refused Bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam

In a judgment that will shape how courts balance civil liberties and national security, the Supreme Court on January 5, 2026, refused bail to student activists Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the alleged “larger conspiracy” behind the February 2020 Delhi riots. The Court held that the violence was not a spontaneous eruption of communal anger but, at least at the stage of bail, appeared to be the product of prior planning and coordination — triggering the strict bail bar under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).

At the same time, the Bench granted bail to five co-accused, under stringent conditions, making clear that liberty under the Constitution depends not on activist labels or the passage of time alone, but on the specific role attributed to each accused.

The core finding: riots as alleged conspiracy, not sudden violence

The prosecution’s central claim — accepted by the Court at the prima facie stage — was that the February 2020 riots followed a structured plan that took shape soon after Parliament cleared the Citizenship Amendment Bill in December 2019. According to the State, protest mobilisation, messaging, and road blockades were not isolated acts but steps in an escalating strategy designed to choke parts of Delhi and provoke confrontation.

This characterisation was decisive. If the violence were treated as spontaneous public disorder, ordinary criminal law would apply. But once framed as a premeditated conspiracy threatening public order and security, the case moved into the UAPA framework, where bail standards are far more restrictive.

How UAPA reshapes the bail question

Under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, courts cannot grant bail if, on a plain reading of the prosecution material, there are “reasonable grounds” to believe the accusations are prima facie true. The Supreme Court emphasised that at this stage it is not judging guilt or weighing defences. Its task is narrower: to see whether the prosecution’s version, taken at face value, legally fits the alleged offences.

Once that threshold is crossed, ordinary considerations like delay or parity do not automatically justify release. This statutory “gatekeeping” role, the Court said, reflects Parliament’s decision to treat terrorism-related offences differently from conventional crimes.

Umar Khalid: why absence from riot sites did not help

A key defence argument for Umar Khalid was that he was not physically present in north-east Delhi when violence erupted. The Court rejected this as misplaced. In conspiracy law, it noted, liability does not depend on being at the scene once the plan has been set in motion.

At the bail stage, the Court accepted the prosecution’s portrayal of Khalid as an alleged ideological and strategic coordinator — someone involved in conceptualisation, messaging, and direction. His physical distance from riot-hit areas, the Court observed, could equally indicate a supervisory role rather than innocence. A conspiracy, it stressed, often works through layers: those who design and steer events need not throw stones themselves.

Sharjeel Imam and the idea of “indirect incitement”

In the case of Sharjeel Imam, the Court dealt with a subtler argument. Imam consistently denied calling for violence, portraying his speeches as political protest. The Court’s response was that conspiracy can exist even without explicit calls to attack.

If an accused outlines actions — such as prolonged “chakka jams” on arterial roads — knowing that they are likely to trigger chaos, communal tension, and police confrontation, then disclaimers of violent intent may not suffice at the bail stage. Where harmful consequences are foreseeable and allegedly built into the plan, the Court said, responsibility cannot be avoided by indirect language.

Why the delay argument did not succeed

Both Khalid and Imam had spent years in custody, and the trial is yet to begin in earnest, with hundreds of witnesses cited. Ordinarily, prolonged incarceration weighs heavily in favour of bail under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court acknowledged this concern but drew a sharp distinction: delay alone does not override the UAPA’s statutory bar when a prima facie case exists. More importantly, it examined trial records and noted that adjournments and procedural disputes were not solely attributable to the prosecution. An accused, the Court held, cannot contribute to delay and then rely on that very delay as a ground for release.

The overlooked principle: differentiating roles within the same conspiracy

Perhaps the most significant doctrinal move in the judgment was its clear differentiation between “principal conspirators” and “peripheral facilitators”, even within the same FIR. The Court held that Khalid and Imam stood on a “qualitatively different footing” from other accused.

Those granted bail were described as local or logistical actors whose continued detention was not essential to prevent reactivation of the alleged conspiracy. By contrast, the Court accepted that Khalid and Imam were portrayed by the prosecution as central figures with ideological and organisational influence — justifying continued custody at this stage.

This role-based approach, the Court said, is intrinsic to bail jurisprudence and does not vanish merely because all accused are charged under a single conspiracy theory.

Why some accused were released — but under tight control

Five co-accused were granted bail, but on conditions so strict that the Court described the arrangement as supervised liberty rather than freedom. They must remain within Delhi-NCR, report regularly to police, surrender passports, avoid public discussion of the case, and have no contact with key conspirators or witnesses. Any breach would lead to immediate cancellation.

The logic was deliberate: custody was replaced with control. The Court signalled that while incarceration was not justified for these accused, the integrity of the trial and public order still required close monitoring.

The “reopener” clause and what lies ahead

Importantly, the Court did not shut the door on future bail for Khalid and Imam. It allowed them to renew their pleas after protected witnesses are examined or after one year, whichever comes first. This clause acts as a constitutional safety valve, ensuring that the UAPA’s severity does not translate into indefinite detention if the trial fails to progress.

The message to both sides is clear. For the prosecution: move the trial forward or risk renewed bail scrutiny. For the accused: liberty claims will be assessed through role, intent, and conduct — not slogans, identities, or delay alone.

In effect, the Supreme Court has redrawn the bail landscape in serious security cases: preserving the State’s power to detain alleged masterminds, while insisting that such power remains tethered to judicial oversight and trial momentum.