China’s Shrinking Population: Why Beijing’s Pro-Birth Push Is Failing

China’s population has been in steady decline since 2022, marking a historic reversal for the world’s most populous country. United Nations projections suggest that by 2050, China’s population will fall to about 1.3 billion from a peak of around 1.4 billion, with nearly 40% of its people aged over 60. This demographic shift lends urgency to an old concern—that China may “get old before it gets rich”. Despite a flurry of policy interventions over the past decade, the downward trend has proven stubborn, raising questions about the limits of state-led population engineering.

From population control to population anxiety

For decades, China’s demographic challenge was one of excess. The one-child policy, introduced in 1979, successfully curbed population growth but left deep social and economic scars. As the consequences of a rapidly ageing society and shrinking workforce became apparent, Beijing reversed course.

Under President Xi Jinping, the one-child policy was abolished in 2016 and replaced with a two-child policy. In 2021, this was expanded to a three-child policy. Yet births have continued to fall, suggesting that policy relaxation alone cannot undo decades of social conditioning and economic pressure.

The latest policy push: incentives, taxes and retirement reform

In response to the accelerating decline, the Chinese government has rolled out a wide array of measures. The most recent, effective January 1, 2026, imposes a 13% value-added tax on contraceptives and condoms—an explicit signal of the state’s intent to discourage birth control use.

Financial incentives have also been introduced. In 2025, Beijing announced a subsidy of 3,600 yuan (about $500) for new parents, paid annually over a child’s first three years. Education costs, a major deterrent for urban couples, have been targeted through fee waivers for the final year of kindergarten and reductions in private kindergarten fees. To stabilise the sector, kindergarten teachers’ salaries have been brought under fiscal guarantees to ensure timely payment.

Managing ageing by extending working lives

Alongside efforts to boost births, China has moved to slow the economic impact of ageing. In 2024, the retirement age was raised—men now retire at 63 instead of 60, while women retire at 58 in white-collar jobs (up from 55) and 55 in blue-collar jobs (up from 50).

This step addresses two pressures at once: a shrinking workforce and mounting pension liabilities. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has warned that, at current trends, the state pension fund could be depleted by 2035 as fewer workers support a growing pool of retirees.

To widen the labour pipeline, age limits for certain civil service examinations have also been relaxed—from 35 to 38, and up to 43 for those with master’s or doctoral degrees.

Engineering a ‘birth-friendly society’

Beyond fiscal and administrative measures, the state has launched a broader social campaign to promote marriage and childbearing. Official messaging increasingly frames family life as a patriotic duty, with repeated calls to build a “birth-friendly society”.

However, this approach has also revealed the intrusive edge of governance. There have been reports of local officials contacting married women to inquire about menstrual cycles and pregnancy plans. The government has also sought to reduce the “bride price”—payments made by the groom’s family to the bride’s—and has floated proposals for “love courses” in universities to encourage relationships among single students.

Xi Jinping’s demographic vision—and its gendered burden

For Xi Jinping, demography is tied to national destiny. At the 20th Communist Party Congress, he pledged to improve population development strategies, reduce the costs of childbirth and education, and raise birth rates. In a 2021 speech, he urged women to be “good wives and good mothers”, linking their personal futures to that of the nation.

Critics argue that this framing places disproportionate responsibility on women, without adequately addressing structural barriers such as workplace discrimination, unequal domestic labour, and limited childcare support. While the state exhorts women to have more children, many face rising job insecurity and penalties for motherhood.

Why the policies are falling short

Despite the breadth of interventions, deeper forces continue to suppress fertility. The legacy of the one-child policy reshaped family norms, making small families socially acceptable and economically rational. Urbanisation, high housing prices, expensive healthcare, and the steep cost of raising and educating children weigh heavily on young couples. High youth unemployment further discourages long-term commitments.

China also continues to grapple with a skewed sex ratio. Decades of son preference during the one-child era have left the country with around 30 million more men than women, complicating marriage prospects and further depressing birth rates.

An unavoidable demographic reckoning

China’s experience highlights a central paradox of demographic policy: while states can restrict births through coercive means, encouraging people to have children in modern, high-cost societies is far more difficult. Financial incentives, moral exhortation and administrative nudges have so far failed to reverse the trend.

As China ages rapidly, the challenge is no longer simply about raising birth numbers, but about adapting its economy, welfare systems and social norms to a smaller, older population—an adjustment that may prove more consequential than any short-term pro-birth campaign.