China’s Claim to India’s Shaksgam Valley and the Pakistan Connection

Even as India–China ties show tentative signs of stabilisation, Beijing’s renewed claim over the Shaksgam Valley has reopened an old and sensitive fault line in the Himalayas. The dispute is not merely about a remote stretch of high-altitude land, but about sovereignty, strategic access, and the deepening China–Pakistan nexus in a region critical to India’s national security.

Where exactly is the Shaksgam Valley?

The Shaksgam Valley, also known as the Trans Karakoram Tract, lies in the Hunza–Gilgit region of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Geographically, it is positioned at a strategic trijunction where India, Pakistan and China converge, close to China’s Xinjiang region and the eastern reaches of the Karakoram range.

The valley is located north of the Siachen Glacier — the world’s highest battlefield — and not far from the Karakoram Pass, which connects Ladakh with China. Its location gives it outsized military and logistical significance despite its sparse population and harsh terrain.

How did the Shaksgam Valley become disputed territory?

Before Independence, the Shaksgam Valley formed part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. After 1947, Pakistan illegally occupied large parts of the region during the first India–Pakistan war, including areas that encompassed Shaksgam.

In 1963, Pakistan signed a boundary agreement with China, under which it ceded around 5,180 sq km of this territory to Beijing. India has consistently rejected this agreement, arguing that Pakistan had no legal right to transfer territory that belonged to India. New Delhi does not recognise the China–Pakistan boundary settlement and considers it illegal and invalid.

Why is China asserting its claim now?

China’s renewed assertions come amid visible infrastructure expansion in the region. Roads and construction activity linked to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have reportedly moved closer to Indian positions near Siachen.

Strategically, control over the Shaksgam Valley provides China with access routes through the Karakoram, shortens supply lines between Xinjiang and Pakistan, and allows Beijing to exert pressure on India’s northern defences. Analysts warn that such moves could enable coordinated pressure from both China and Pakistan during a crisis.

The military and strategic stakes for India

From India’s perspective, the Shaksgam Valley sits uncomfortably close to two critical theatres — the Line of Control with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control with China. Indian positions on the Siachen Glacier allow monitoring of Pakistani movements, while Ladakh provides vantage points over Chinese deployments.

Any permanent Chinese presence south of the Karakoram ridge alters the security calculus by narrowing buffer zones and raising the possibility of a two-front challenge in high-altitude terrain.

India’s official position and diplomatic response

The “Ministry of External Affairs” has reiterated that Shaksgam Valley is Indian territory and that New Delhi has never recognised the 1963 China–Pakistan agreement. India has also rejected CPEC projects passing through PoK, calling them violations of its sovereignty.

New Delhi has protested Chinese infrastructure activity in the region, particularly road construction close to Siachen. Indian military leadership has also made it clear that any activity in the valley lacks legitimacy in India’s view.

Pakistan’s role in the dispute

Pakistan’s involvement lies at the heart of the issue. By ceding territory to China, Islamabad deepened its strategic partnership with Beijing while complicating India’s territorial claims. For China, Pakistan provides both diplomatic cover and physical access to contested regions.

This alignment has allowed Beijing to assert claims while maintaining its official stance that the Kashmir issue should be resolved peacefully — a position India has described as contradictory, given China’s actions on the ground.

Why the issue matters beyond borders

The Shaksgam Valley dispute illustrates how unresolved territorial questions continue to shape geopolitics in the Himalayas. It underscores the fragility of India–China rapprochement and highlights how infrastructure, rather than troop movements alone, has become a key instrument of strategic competition.

As India watches Chinese activity inch closer to sensitive zones, the valley remains a reminder that historical agreements, strategic geography, and present-day power politics are deeply intertwined — and that stability in the region remains contingent on far more than diplomatic gestures.