Battle of Adwa

The Battle of Adwa, fought on 1 March 1896 near the northern Ethiopian town of Adwa, was the decisive engagement of the First Italo-Ethiopian War. The Ethiopian victory, achieved under Emperor Menelik II against Italian and Eritrean colonial forces commanded by General Oreste Baratieri, prevented the Kingdom of Italy from imposing colonial dominance over Ethiopia. By the end of the nineteenth century, Ethiopia stood as the only African state to have maintained political independence during the era of European imperial expansion, giving the battle enduring symbolic status across Africa and the global Black diaspora.

Background to the Conflict

The origins of the war lie in the Treaty of Wuchale, concluded in 1889 between the Italian government and Menelik II, then King of Shewa and soon Emperor of Ethiopia. Italy had recently consolidated its presence in Eritrea and sought to extend its influence inland. The treaty recognised Italy’s control of Eritrea and promised Menelik financial support and military matériel. However, a critical dispute soon emerged concerning Article 17 of the treaty: the Italian-language version stipulated that Ethiopia must conduct foreign affairs through Rome, effectively making the state an Italian protectorate, while the Amharic version stated only that Ethiopia could make use of Italian diplomatic channels at its discretion.
The Italian government insisted on the validity of its own interpretation, claiming that Menelik had knowingly accepted the binding wording. Menelik rejected this claim and denounced the attempt to curtail Ethiopian sovereignty. Italy chose to enforce its interpretation through military pressure, precipitating the First Italo-Ethiopian War.
Tensions escalated with rebellions and local conflicts. In December 1894 Bahta Hagos led an uprising in Italian-occupied Akele Guzai, which was crushed by colonial forces. Italian units subsequently defeated Mengesha Yohannes at Coatit in January 1895, forcing him southwards. By late 1895 Italian forces had advanced into Tigray Province, only to be halted by a resurgent Ethiopian counter-offensive. On 7 December 1895 Ethiopian commanders including Ras Makonnen, Fitawrari Gebeyehu and Ras Mengesha Yohannes destroyed a small Italian detachment at the first Battle of Amba Alagi, compelling the Italians to withdraw to defensive positions.
By early 1896 both sides faced dwindling supplies. Menelik’s large army lived off local provisions, which were becoming exhausted. General Baratieri hoped that the Ethiopian army would dissolve once resources were depleted, but mounting pressure from Rome forced him to act. Italian ministers, dissatisfied with his cautious approach, insisted on an immediate offensive. During a tense meeting with his brigadiers on 29 February, Baratieri proposed a retreat to preserve the army’s strength. His subordinates, however, argued vehemently for an attack, fearing the political humiliation of withdrawal. Overruled, Baratieri ordered an advance for the following morning.

Forces Assembled for Battle

Ethiopia’s mobilisation for the war was unprecedented in scale. Estimates vary, but most contemporary and modern accounts place the Ethiopian force between 73,000 and over 100,000 men. The army combined riflemen, cavalry and spearmen drawn from imperial, regional and aristocratic levies. Emperor Menelik II led a central contingent, supported by Empress Taytu Betul and prominent nobles such as Negus Tekle Haymanot of Gojjam, Ras Makonnen of Harar, Ras Mengesha Yohannes, Ras Alula, Ras Mikael of Wollo, Ras Welle Betul and Wagshum Guangul.
Large numbers of camp followers accompanied the army, providing logistical support in accordance with long-standing Ethiopian military practice. Riflemen constituted the bulk of the force, many equipped with imported firearms acquired through trade or diplomacy, though significant numbers of cavalry and spearmen also participated. Wollo cavalry units, renowned for their mobility, formed an important part of the mounted arm.
In contrast, the Italian forces were far smaller. The combat-effective strength on the field is estimated between 14,500 and 17,700 troops, including Italian regulars and Eritrean askaris organised into four brigades. One brigade under General Matteo Albertone consisted largely of Eritrean troops led by Italian officers. The remaining brigades under Generals Arimondi, Dabormida and Ellena comprised Italian recruits, some of whom lacked experience. Italian artillery included 56 guns, though these advantages were offset by inadequate supplies, difficult terrain and the numerical superiority of Ethiopian forces.

The Italian Advance and Opening Engagements

Baratieri organised his attack plan around a night march intended to catch Menelik’s forces unprepared. The Ethiopian army, however, had already concentrated in strong positions across the broken terrain east of Adwa. The Italians advanced in three separate columns, aiming to seize high ground at Abba Garima and then force a confrontation. In the darkness, the columns became dispersed, with Albertone’s Eritrean brigade drifting too far east and becoming isolated.
At dawn, Albertone’s troops encountered the forces of Ras Alula and Ras Mengesha Yohannes. The Ethiopian commanders launched an aggressive assault, overwhelming the brigade with superior numbers. The Italian right collapsed, sending survivors fleeing back towards the centre. Meanwhile, Ras Makonnen’s and Ras Mikael’s forces struck the Italian centre and left as they struggled to form cohesive defensive lines.
Baratieri’s brigadiers attempted to stabilise their positions, but the Ethiopian assault intensified across several fronts. Terrain proved a major disadvantage for Italian manoeuvres: the steep hills and rocky slopes restricted movement and hampered artillery deployment. As Ethiopian commanders committed fresh reserves, Italian units began to yield under mounting pressure.

Collapse of the Italian Position

General Arimondi’s brigade fought tenaciously but was gradually enveloped by converging Ethiopian forces. General Dabormida, tasked with supporting the right, instead found his brigade isolated in the rugged valleys south of the battlefield. As Ethiopian units pressed in from multiple directions, his troops were overwhelmed. Dabormida was killed in action, and his brigade ceased to exist as an organised force.
The Eritrean askaris, many of whom fought with determination despite overwhelming odds, suffered particularly heavy casualties. The remaining Italian troops attempted to withdraw towards Saurià, but rapid Ethiopian advances disrupted any orderly retreat. Losses mounted swiftly, and within hours the Italian army had effectively disintegrated as a fighting force.
Baratieri, recognising the total collapse of his position, ordered a retreat towards Adi Quala. The remnants of the army abandoned much of their equipment, and numerous Italian soldiers were taken prisoner. Ethiopian casualties were significant but sustainable given the size of Menelik’s forces.

Consequences and Historical Legacy

The scale of the defeat shocked the Italian government and European observers. The Treaty of Addis Ababa, signed later in 1896, recognised Ethiopia as a fully sovereign state, nullifying the disputed provisions of the Treaty of Wuchale. Italy was compelled to retreat to its coastal enclave in Eritrea and abandon immediate ambitions of inland expansion.
The victory at Adwa reverberated widely. Within Ethiopia it reinforced imperial authority and consolidated Menelik’s legitimacy as a modernising ruler. Across Africa and the diaspora, Adwa became a potent symbol of anti-colonial resistance and pan-African pride, celebrated as evidence that an African army could defeat a European imperial power. Writers, activists and nationalists later invoked Adwa as an emblem of African sovereignty during twentieth-century struggles for independence.