America Turns Inward: Why Washington Is Reasserting Power in Its Hemisphere While Stepping Back From Europe

As 2025 draws to a close, the United States has undertaken its largest troop mobilisation in the Caribbean in decades, deploying its most advanced aircraft carrier, fighter jets, amphibious vessels and submarines to intensify pressure on Venezuela. This dramatic show of force coincides with a striking strategic shift articulated in the Trump administration’s latest National Security Strategy (NSS): a renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere, even as Washington signals declining interest in underwriting European security. The moment raises a larger question about America’s changing place in a world no longer shaped by a single dominant power.

What the U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean signals

The deployment aimed at Venezuela is not merely about regime pressure on President “Nicolás Maduro”. It reflects a broader strategic message. The NSS released in December 2025 identifies Latin America and the Caribbean as a priority theatre, explicitly reviving the Monroe Doctrine’s core idea: that the U.S. will deny “outside powers” — a thinly veiled reference to China — strategic influence in the region.

This muscular posture marks a return to hemispheric consolidation. Historically, the U.S. secured its rise to global power by asserting dominance in its immediate neighbourhood before projecting influence overseas. The Caribbean deployment echoes that logic, suggesting Washington sees the Western Hemisphere as the one arena where it can still exercise near-uncontested primacy.

The Monroe Doctrine makes a 21st-century comeback

First articulated in the 19th century, the Monroe Doctrine was less about isolationism than exclusion — keeping rival powers out of the Americas. The Trump administration’s NSS reframes this doctrine for an era of great power competition, where China’s economic penetration of Latin America through infrastructure, loans and trade is viewed as a strategic threat.

By recommitting to hemispheric dominance, the U.S. appears to be prioritising regions where geography, history and power asymmetry still work decisively in its favour. This is a sharper, more defensible line than sustaining open-ended security commitments far from home.

Why Europe is no longer Washington’s primary concern

The same NSS that elevates Latin America explicitly downplays Europe. Since the Second World War, the U.S. has been the principal security guarantor of Europe, first through the Cold War and later by expanding “North Atlantic Treaty Organization” eastward after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Under President “Donald Trump”, however, Washington has questioned the sustainability of this role.

Trump’s argument is not merely transactional — though burden-sharing is a recurring theme — but structural. The U.S. now faces a long-term strategic contest with “China”, a rival whose economic and military rise is unprecedented in scale. In this context, Europe is increasingly seen as a resource drain rather than a decisive front.

From unipolarity to a world of three great powers

The post-1991 unipolar moment, when the U.S. stood unrivalled, has clearly ended. While America remains the world’s most powerful military and economic actor, it no longer shapes outcomes alone. Alongside China stands “Russia”, a weaker economic power but one with nuclear parity, vast resources and a demonstrated willingness to use force.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its endurance despite sanctions exposed the limits of the so-called “rules-based order”. China’s rise, meanwhile, presents a more fundamental challenge. Unlike the Soviet Union, whose economy never exceeded 60% of U.S. GDP, China’s economy has already crossed two-thirds of America’s size and continues to grow faster, translating wealth into military capacity.

The logic behind stepping back — and leaning closer

Faced with this reality, the Trump administration appears to be experimenting with a form of offshore balancing. The idea is to reduce direct military commitments in regions like Europe, encourage allies to take on more responsibility, and conserve American power for the primary contest with China.

This approach also explains Washington’s openness to a potential reset with Moscow. While Russia and China share an interest in opposing Western dominance, their partnership is not an alliance of equals. From Washington’s perspective, loosening the Moscow–Beijing axis — even marginally — could complicate China’s strategic calculus.

A fluid multipolar order, not a settled one

Today’s global system is already multipolar, but unlike earlier transitions, it lacks clear rules or stable blocs. China has no formal alliance network comparable to Cold War-era structures; the U.S. is reassessing its own alliances; and Russia resists being reduced to a junior partner to Beijing.

This fluidity creates space for middle powers such as India, Brazil, Japan and Germany to hedge rather than align fully. It also makes Russia a “swing” great power — strong enough to influence outcomes, but not dominant enough to anchor an order of its own.

Why the Western Hemisphere now matters more

In this unsettled landscape, the Western Hemisphere stands out as the one region where the U.S. can still plausibly enforce primacy. Consolidating influence closer to home reduces exposure, shortens supply lines, and secures strategic depth as competition with China intensifies in Asia.

Whether President Trump can successfully execute this recalibration remains uncertain. His foreign policy is often impulsive and contradictory. Yet the underlying shift — away from expansive global guardianship and toward selective consolidation — reflects structural changes that future American presidents may find difficult to reverse.