Why Bangladesh’s Current Turmoil Is Less a Sudden Crisis — and More a Familiar Political Pattern

At moments of intense upheaval, it is often useful to step back and view events through a longer historical lens. That perspective is essential to understand what is unfolding in Bangladesh today. Power transitions in the country have rarely been smooth, democratic alternation has been the exception rather than the norm, and political competition has often taken the form of winner-takes-all battles. The current instability, therefore, is less an aberration than a continuation of entrenched patterns — with new risks layered onto old fault lines.

A history of zero-sum politics since 1975

Since the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975, Bangladesh has struggled to institutionalise peaceful transfers of power. Even when elections have taken place, the victorious party has typically consolidated authority while marginalising or suppressing the opposition.

For decades, national politics has revolved around a bitter rivalry between Khaleda Zia — the widow of military ruler Ziaur Rahman — and Sheikh Hasina, Mujib’s daughter and leader of the Awami League. Their confrontation defined Bangladesh’s political culture: personalised, polarised, and unforgiving.

A rare departure from this pattern came in 1991, when the two leaders joined forces to oust military dictator Hussain Muhammad Ershad. Notably, Ershad was not subjected to violent retribution; he remained politically active until his death in 2019. The contrast with today’s atmosphere of vendetta is stark.

Abuse of power is not new — nor unique to one leader

While Sheikh Hasina’s recent record has drawn sharp criticism, she is far from the only Bangladeshi leader accused of undermining democratic norms. Khaleda Zia herself failed to extend her rule beyond her term, not for want of trying, but because of allegations of corruption and misuse of power. The political cost was borne even by her family, with her son forced into exile under military pressure.

Seen against this 50-year record, the sudden moral outrage in some Western capitals over Bangladesh’s democratic backsliding appears selective. The country has seldom functioned as a model liberal democracy, regardless of who occupied office.

The Yunus narrative and India’s scepticism

The elevation of Muhammad Yunus as a democratic saviour has found limited resonance in India. The sharp vilification of Hasina, paired with the near-messianic portrayal of Yunus as an icon of tolerance and inclusion, is viewed in New Delhi as detached from Bangladesh’s political realities.

More critically, the focus on personalities has obscured the deeper institutional vacuum that has emerged since August 2024 — a vacuum increasingly exploited by actors with agendas far removed from democratic reform.

Who benefits from the chaos — and who loses

Two clear beneficiaries of the present disorder stand out: right-wing Islamist forces led by the Jamaat-e-Islami, and Pakistan. Both have capitalised on the political uncertainty and weakening state authority.

The principal losers are ordinary Bangladeshis, particularly the youth, who are being mobilised through emotive narratives, unrealistic promises, and the construction of external enemies — most notably India. While debates about identity and development are legitimate, deflecting blame onto India serves mainly as a tool of political manipulation.

Despite social media imagery, a large silent majority in Bangladesh appears unconvinced by this rhetoric and eager to return to everyday concerns — employment, stability, and governance — provided external mischief does not derail that possibility.

Islamist consolidation and shrinking civic space

Over the past 16 months, Islamist influence has quietly but steadily penetrated key institutions. Embedded within the ruling coterie, these actors have reportedly enjoyed near-immunity. Media outlets have become increasingly cautious, avoiding contrarian views amid fear and intimidation. Mob justice and street-level vigilantism have resurfaced, eroding the rule of law.

In this context, Yunus and his advisers have come to be seen not as neutral reformers, but as participants in — or at least enablers of — the emerging imbalance.

The election dilemma: necessary, but deeply fraught

Elections appear to be the only viable exit from the current morass, yet the conditions for credible polls are far from ideal. State capacity is fragile, institutions are compromised, and political trust is minimal. The expected return of BNP leader Tarique Rahman after 17 years in exile could further inflame tensions, particularly if developments related to Khaleda Zia’s health provoke mass mobilisation.

Once allies against the Awami League, the BNP and Jamaat are now rivals, each convinced that this is their moment. Jamaat’s organisational readiness gives it an early-mover advantage, raising fears that it may seek power without electoral legitimacy.

An election that excludes the Awami League, however, would lack credibility and inclusiveness — undermining its very purpose.

India’s calibrated stance and the regional stakes

India has signalled that it is prepared to engage with any legitimate political formation that emerges in Bangladesh. At the same time, New Delhi is acutely aware of Pakistan’s role in fanning instability and remains sensitive to genuine Bangladeshi public sentiment.

Crucially, India is not responsible for Bangladesh’s internal political choices. If Dhaka produces a government that seeks cooperative relations, India is unlikely to rebuff it. But attempts to assert autonomy by aligning with Pakistan or by tolerating attacks on minorities would ultimately threaten Bangladesh’s own stability more than India’s interests.

The forgotten majority

Amid the power struggles, street mobilisations, and geopolitical manoeuvring, Bangladesh’s silent majority remains largely unheard. They are neither invested in vendettas nor persuaded by manufactured antagonisms. Their aspirations are modest but vital: peace, dignity, and a chance to move forward.

Whether Bangladesh’s political class can rise above zero-sum instincts to meet those aspirations will determine not just the outcome of the present crisis, but the country’s democratic trajectory for years to come.