Operation Pawan (1987)

Operation Pawan was a major Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka, launched in July 1987, as part of India’s effort to enforce the Indo–Sri Lanka Accord and restore peace between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil militant groups, most notably the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It was conducted by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and marked one of the most complex and controversial operations in India’s post-independence military history.

Background and Context

The Sri Lankan Civil War, which erupted in the early 1980s, stemmed from ethnic tensions between the Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority. Tamil militants, particularly the LTTE, demanded the creation of an independent Tamil homeland called Tamil Eelam in the north and east of the island.
By 1987, escalating violence and a humanitarian crisis in northern Sri Lanka, especially in Jaffna, prompted India to intervene diplomatically and militarily. The Indo–Sri Lanka Accord, signed on 29 July 1987 by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene, sought to:

• End hostilities between the Sri Lankan forces and Tamil militants.
• Ensure devolution of power to Tamil-majority regions through a provincial council system.
• Disarm Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE.
• Guarantee the withdrawal of Indian troops once peace was restored.

Under this agreement, India agreed to send a peacekeeping contingent—the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)—to oversee the surrender of arms, maintain law and order, and facilitate the political process.

Deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force

The IPKF, initially welcomed by the Sri Lankan government, was deployed in northern and eastern Sri Lanka starting July 1987. It included elements from the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, with strength eventually rising to over 70,000 personnel.
Key Indian Army formations included:

• 54 Infantry Division, based in Secunderabad.
• 36 Infantry Division, headquartered at Vairengte.
• Para Commando and Special Forces units.

The Indian Navy ensured sea transport and logistical support, while the Indian Air Force undertook airlifts and surveillance operations.

Course of the Operation

Initially, the IPKF was deployed to facilitate the ceasefire and oversee the disarmament of militant groups. However, relations with the LTTE deteriorated rapidly when the organisation refused to surrender its weapons, suspecting betrayal by both India and Sri Lanka.
By October 1987, open hostilities broke out between the IPKF and LTTE, leading to full-scale combat operations—officially designated as Operation Pawan.
Key stages of the operation included:

1. Battle of Jaffna (October–November 1987):
   • The IPKF launched an offensive to capture Jaffna Peninsula, the LTTE’s stronghold.
   • Intense urban combat took place, particularly in Jaffna University and surrounding areas.
   • Despite heavy casualties on both sides, the IPKF succeeded in capturing Jaffna city.
2. Operations in the Eastern Provinces (1988–1989):
   • The IPKF extended its operations to Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Vavuniya, aiming to dismantle LTTE infrastructure.
   • It faced guerrilla warfare tactics, land mines, and ambushes, resulting in prolonged counter-insurgency operations.
3. Civic and Humanitarian Initiatives:
   • The IPKF also engaged in humanitarian assistance, rebuilding schools, hospitals, and roads, and restoring civil administration in liberated areas.

Despite these efforts, the LTTE continued to regroup and wage asymmetric warfare, using the dense jungle terrain to its advantage.

Challenges and Controversies

Operation Pawan was one of India’s most complex military missions, facing several challenges:

• Hostile Environment: The IPKF operated in unfamiliar territory, with limited intelligence and local support.
• Political Ambiguity: The shifting stance of the Sri Lankan government, which sometimes cooperated with the LTTE, complicated military objectives.
• Asymmetric Warfare: The LTTE’s guerrilla tactics, including suicide bombings, inflicted heavy casualties on Indian forces.
• Domestic Criticism: Back home, the mission drew criticism for its rising human and financial costs and lack of clear strategic goals.

Casualty estimates vary, but around 1,200 Indian soldiers were killed and 3,000 wounded during the three-year deployment.

Withdrawal of the IPKF

Following Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991 (later confirmed to have been carried out by LTTE operatives), Operation Pawan came under renewed scrutiny. However, India had already begun withdrawing troops earlier:

• Under Prime Minister V. P. Singh, the withdrawal process started in 1989 after negotiations with the newly elected Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa.
• The complete withdrawal of the IPKF was completed by March 1990, marking the end of India’s direct involvement in the Sri Lankan conflict.

Strategic and Historical Significance

Operation Pawan left a deep imprint on India’s foreign and defence policy:

• It highlighted the complexity of peacekeeping missions in foreign territories.
• It demonstrated India’s willingness to act as a regional stabilising power, albeit with mixed results.
• It exposed the difficulties of balancing military operations with diplomatic and political objectives.

The operation also served as a valuable lesson in counter-insurgency warfare, leading to doctrinal reforms within the Indian Army.

Legacy

Despite its controversies, Operation Pawan showcased the professionalism and courage of the Indian armed forces operating under difficult conditions. It remains one of the most extensive overseas military deployments in Indian history and contributed to shaping India’s modern approach toward regional peacekeeping and strategic autonomy.