Article 131A

Article 131A of the Constitution of India was a short-lived provision that once vested the Supreme Court of India with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of Central laws. Introduced during the period of constitutional change in the 1970s, it aimed to centralise judicial authority in matters concerning Central legislation. However, the Article was later repealed by the Constitution (Forty-third Amendment) Act, 1977, marking a significant shift in the judicial balance between the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

Background and Introduction of Article 131A

Article 131A was introduced by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, often referred to as the “Mini-Constitution” because of the wide-ranging changes it brought to the constitutional framework. The amendment was enacted during the Emergency period (1975–77) under the government led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
The provision was inserted with the stated objective of ensuring uniformity in the interpretation of Central laws throughout the country. It provided that only the Supreme Court would have the power to decide upon the constitutional validity of any Central law, effectively removing this jurisdiction from the High Courts.

Purpose and Objective

The main purpose of Article 131A was to:

• Establish a single, centralised judicial authority to adjudicate questions concerning the constitutional validity of laws made by Parliament.
• Prevent divergent interpretations of Central laws by different High Courts, thereby promoting legal consistency across States.
• Strengthen the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority and reduce the possibility of conflicting judgments regarding Central legislation.

In effect, Article 131A sought to streamline constitutional interpretation by consolidating judicial power within the apex court.

Text and Scope of Article 131A

The provision stated that “notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have, to the exclusion of any other court, jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of any Central law.”
This meant that no High Court could entertain petitions challenging the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament. Litigants were required to approach the Supreme Court directly for such matters, bypassing the High Court system altogether.
While the intention was to promote judicial efficiency and coherence, in practice it had the effect of restricting access to justice, as it denied citizens the right to challenge Central laws before High Courts—courts that were geographically and procedurally more accessible.

Criticism and Controversy

Article 131A faced considerable criticism from legal scholars, jurists, and political leaders for undermining the federal and decentralised character of India’s judiciary. The principal criticisms were as follows:

• It eroded the jurisdiction of the High Courts, which under Articles 226 and 227, have wide powers of judicial review.
• It centralised judicial authority in the Supreme Court, increasing the burden on an already overworked apex court.
• It limited the right of citizens to approach High Courts for constitutional remedies, thereby diminishing access to justice.
• It was viewed as part of a broader attempt by the government to curtail judicial independence during the Emergency.

Many constitutional experts considered Article 131A inconsistent with the basic structure doctrine, particularly the principles of judicial review, federalism, and access to justice, as upheld by the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973).

Repeal by the Forty-third Amendment

Recognising these constitutional and practical difficulties, the Janata Party Government, which came to power after the Emergency, undertook to restore judicial independence and constitutional balance.
The Constitution (Forty-third Amendment) Act, 1977, which came into effect on 13 April 1978, repealed Article 131A along with several other provisions introduced by the Forty-second Amendment. The repeal reinstated the jurisdiction of High Courts to entertain challenges to the validity of Central laws under Article 226.
The deletion of Article 131A was a significant corrective measure that reaffirmed the federal character of the judiciary and restored the multi-tiered system of constitutional review.

Impact of the Repeal

The repeal of Article 131A had several important implications for the Indian judicial system:

• It revived the powers of the High Courts to examine and decide on the constitutional validity of Central legislation.
• It reaffirmed the importance of judicial decentralisation, enabling citizens to seek relief more easily at the State level.
• It restored the balance of judicial power between the Supreme Court and the High Courts, in keeping with the original constitutional design.
• It reinforced the principle of judicial review as a cornerstone of constitutional democracy in India.

Since the repeal, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in constitutional matters has continued to operate under Articles 32 and 136, while the High Courts have exercised their powers under Article 226, maintaining a dual structure for the enforcement of constitutional rights.

Relationship with Other Constitutional Provisions

Article 131A was conceptually linked to several key Articles of the Constitution:

• Article 131: Granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over certain intergovernmental disputes.
• Article 32: Empowered individuals to approach the Supreme Court directly for enforcement of fundamental rights.
• Article 226: Conferred upon the High Courts the power to issue writs for enforcement of fundamental and legal rights.

The introduction of Article 131A temporarily disrupted this balance by restricting the scope of Article 226 in matters involving Central laws. Its repeal restored the intended symmetry of judicial powers between the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

Constitutional and Historical Significance

The brief existence and subsequent repeal of Article 131A exemplify the evolutionary nature of India’s Constitution. It reflects how constitutional mechanisms are periodically reviewed and refined to maintain the delicate equilibrium among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
The episode surrounding Article 131A serves as a reminder of two enduring constitutional principles:

• Judicial independence is indispensable for preserving the rule of law.
• Decentralised judicial access is vital for ensuring that constitutional remedies remain available to all citizens.