Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India

The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, popularly known as the Anti-Defection Law, was added by the Fifty-Second Amendment Act of 1985 to curb political defections by legislators. It lays down the process by which legislators — either in the Parliament or in State Legislatures — may be disqualified on grounds of defection. The main objective of the Tenth Schedule is to ensure stability, integrity, and discipline within the legislative system by preventing elected members from changing parties for personal or political gain.

Background and Context

Before the enactment of the Anti-Defection Law, Indian politics witnessed frequent party-switching by legislators, often motivated by personal rewards or ministerial positions.

• Between 1967 and 1972, over 2,000 legislators changed parties across India, resulting in the term “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram” — coined after a Haryana MLA, Gaya Lal, switched parties thrice in a single day in 1967.
• Such defections led to political instability, frequent government collapses, and corruption in public life.

To address this, the Rajiv Gandhi Government enacted the Fifty-Second Amendment Act, 1985, introducing the Tenth Schedule. Later, the Ninety-First Amendment Act, 2003 strengthened its provisions by removing exemptions and limiting ministerial positions.

Objectives of the Tenth Schedule

1. To curb political defections motivated by the lure of office or monetary gains.
2. To promote political stability and prevent the fall of governments due to shifting loyalties.
3. To ensure party discipline and loyalty among elected representatives.
4. To maintain the morality and ethics of the political process.

Main Provisions of the Tenth Schedule

1. Grounds for Disqualification (Paragraph 2)

A member of a legislature (Parliament or State Assembly) can be disqualified on the following grounds:
(a) Voluntary Giving Up of Membership:

• If a member voluntarily gives up the membership of the political party on whose ticket he or she was elected.
• “Voluntarily giving up” is not limited to resignation; it can be inferred from conduct, such as publicly opposing the party or supporting a rival.

(b) Voting or Abstaining Contrary to Party Directions:

• If a member votes or abstains from voting in the House contrary to the whip or direction issued by his or her political party, without prior permission.
• However, if such action is condoned by the party within 15 days, the member is not disqualified.

(c) Independent Members:

• An independent member (not elected on any party ticket) becomes disqualified if he or she joins a political party after the election.

(d) Nominated Members:

• A nominated member of the legislature is disqualified if he or she joins a political party after six months from the date of taking the seat.

2. Exceptions (Paragraph 4 and 5)

Initially, the law allowed two exceptions:
(a) Merger Provision:

• A member is not disqualified if his/her original political party merges with another and two-thirds of its legislators agree to the merger.
• Those who do not accept the merger and choose to function as a separate group are also exempted.

(b) Split Provision (Removed in 2003):

• Earlier, if one-third of members of a legislative party split to form a new group, they were exempted from disqualification.
• This provision led to misuse, and the Ninety-First Amendment Act, 2003 deleted it.

3. Authority to Decide on Disqualification (Paragraph 6)

• The Chairperson or Speaker of the respective House is empowered to decide disqualification cases under the Tenth Schedule.
• The Speaker’s decision is final, but it is subject to judicial review by the courts (as per subsequent Supreme Court rulings).

4. Time Frame for Decision

• The Schedule does not prescribe any specific time limit for the Speaker or Chairman to decide disqualification cases, which has been a point of criticism and controversy.

Constitutional Amendments Related to the Tenth Schedule

1. Fifty-Second Amendment Act, 1985:

• Introduced the Tenth Schedule to curb political defections.

2. Ninety-First Amendment Act, 2003:

• Strengthened the Anti-Defection Law by:
  • Deleting the “split” provision (Paragraph 3).
  • Restricting the size of the Council of Ministers to 15% of the total strength of the legislature.
  • Disqualifying defectors from holding ministerial office or any political post until they are re-elected.

Role of the Speaker

• The Speaker or Chairman acts as the adjudicating authority in disqualification cases.
• However, their role has often been criticised as being partisan, since they belong to political parties themselves.
• Judicial decisions have sought to ensure fairness and neutrality in this process.

Judicial Interpretation

Several landmark Supreme Court judgments have interpreted and refined the operation of the Tenth Schedule:

1. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)

• The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule.
• However, it ruled that the Speaker’s decision is subject to judicial review under Articles 136, 226, and 227 of the Constitution.
• The Court described the Speaker as a tribunal under the law.

2. Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya (2007)

• The Court held that the Speaker’s decision to delay ruling on disqualification petitions can be challenged in court.

3. Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016)

• The Supreme Court ruled that the Speaker cannot decide disqualification petitions while facing a no-confidence motion, to ensure impartiality.

4. Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020)

• The Court recommended that the Speaker should decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period, preferably within three months.

Criticisms of the Anti-Defection Law

While the Tenth Schedule succeeded in reducing large-scale defections, it has also faced significant criticism:

1. Erosion of Legislative Freedom:
   • By enforcing strict party discipline through whips, it restricts legislators’ ability to vote according to conscience or constituency interests.
2. Partisan Role of the Speaker:
   • The Speaker, being affiliated with a political party, may act biasedly in disqualification cases.
3. Encouragement of Group Defections:
   • The merger clause has sometimes been exploited to legitimise mass defections under the guise of mergers.
4. Judicial Delays:
   • Absence of fixed timelines allows prolonged indecision, leading to political manipulation.
5. Weakening of Opposition and Debate:
   • Legislators are often compelled to conform to party decisions, weakening democratic deliberation in legislatures.

Suggested Reforms

1. Independent Adjudicatory Authority:
   • Transfer the power to decide defection cases from the Speaker to an independent tribunal (possibly headed by a retired judge).
2. Time-Bound Decision Process:
   • Specify a maximum period (e.g., 3 months) for disposal of defection cases.
3. Partial Relaxation of Party Whip:
   • Limit the whip to only confidence votes, money bills, and no-confidence motions, allowing freedom in other legislative matters.
4. Greater Accountability:
   • Mandate transparency and disclosure of reasons for all disqualification decisions.

Significance of the Tenth Schedule

Despite its limitations, the Tenth Schedule has played a vital role in Indian democracy:

• Reduced political instability caused by rampant defections.
• Strengthened party cohesion and government stability.
• Promoted accountability among legislators to their political platforms.