Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)

The case Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) is a landmark Supreme Court judgment in India on the constitutionality of restrictions on online speech. It dealt with challenges to Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and also examined related provisions governing intermediary liability and content blocking. The Court struck down Section 66A entirely for being vague, overbroad and incompatible with the freedom of speech guarantee under the Constitution.

Background

• The Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) was amended in 2008–09 to introduce Section 66A, which criminalised the sending of information via computer resource or communication device if it was “grossly offensive”, “menacing”, or intended to “cause annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will.”
• The language of Section 66A was criticised as vague and susceptible to misuse, especially in the context of online communication, where ordinary speech might be misinterpreted.
• In 2012, two women (Shaheen Dhada and Rinu) were arrested under Section 66A by Mumbai police for posting comments on Facebook critical of a bandh (shutdown) following the death of a political leader. Although they were released, the incident spurred multiple writ petitions challenging 66A.
• Those petitions (filed under Article 32 of the Constitution) were clubbed and heard by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court (Justices Chelameswar and Nariman).

Legal Issues

1. Constitutional validity of Section 66A under Articles 19(1)(a), 14 and 21 of the Constitution (i.e. whether it violated the freedom of speech, equality, and liberty)
2. Whether the restrictions imposed by Section 66A could be “reasonable restrictions” under Article 19(2) of the Constitution
3. Whether Sections 69A and 79 of the IT Act (relating to content blocking and intermediary liability) should be read down to conform to constitutional limits
4. Whether Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act (to the extent it overlaps with 66A) is also unconstitutional

Judgment & Reasoning

• The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A entirely, declaring it unconstitutional.
• The Court held that Section 66A was vague and overbroad. Terms like “annoyance”, “inconvenience”, “insult” did not have precise definitions, giving excessive discretion to law enforcement and chilling free speech.
• The Court emphasised the concept of the “chilling effect” — vague laws may deter lawful speech because people fear prosecution.
• It was held that Section 66A failed the test of reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) because it did not require a close nexus to harm (e.g. incitement to public disorder). The Court read that “public order” in Article 19(2) must be interpreted narrowly, and that mere annoyance or insult could not be grounds for restriction.
• On Article 14, the Court rejected the argument that Section 66A discriminated against speech via the Internet. It observed that there is an intelligible differentia — the Internet allows mass reach at minimal cost, distinguishing it from other media — and thus it’s not an unconstitutional classification.
• Sections 69A and 79 were read down:
  • Section 79 (which generally shields intermediaries from liability for third-party content) was read to mean that an intermediary must act only on receiving actual knowledge (specifically, a court or government takedown order), rather than proactively policing all content.
  • Section 69A (power to block content) was upheld, subject to safeguards in procedure, as it was seen to be a more narrowly tailored provision with oversight.
• Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act was struck down to the extent it invoked 66A in its enforcement.

Significance & Impact

• Protection for online free speech: The decision is widely regarded as a watershed for freedom of expression in the digital age in India—it emphasised that the same constitutional safeguards apply online as offline.
• Doctrine of overbreadth & chilling effect: The judgment strengthened jurisprudence on how vague laws suppress free speech and introduced stronger scrutiny against broad restrictions.
• Limits on intermediary liability: Platforms and intermediaries cannot be held liable merely for hosting content unless properly notified by a court or authority; they are not required to act as content police.
• Precedent for content blocking: The case continues to influence litigation over government orders to block content, especially in balancing state power and procedural safeguards. As recently as 2025, parties have invoked Shreya Singhal in challenges to blocking orders under Section 79.
• Continuing violations: Despite the judgment, the use of Section 66A persisted in some FIRs and prosecutions in lower courts, prompting subsequent litigation concerning enforcement.