DF-21D

DF-21D

The DF-21D (Chinese: 东风-21D; NATO reporting name: CSS-5 Mod-5) is a medium-range, road-mobile, anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) developed by the People’s Republic of China. It is part of the Dong Feng (East Wind) missile family and is often described as the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile designed to target and destroy large naval vessels, particularly aircraft carriers. The DF-21D represents a key component of China’s evolving anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, aimed at deterring and countering U.S. naval dominance in the western Pacific region.

Development and Background

The DF-21 series originated from the DF-2 and DF-3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles developed in the 1960s and 1970s. The base DF-21 missile was introduced in the 1980s as a solid-fuel, two-stage, road-mobile missile designed to deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads.
The DF-21D variant emerged in the late 2000s as part of China’s effort to develop capabilities to challenge U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups operating near its maritime periphery. It was first revealed publicly in 2010, though development is believed to have begun in the 1990s under the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) (previously known as the Second Artillery Corps).

Technical Characteristics

While specific details remain classified, the DF-21D’s estimated performance parameters are as follows:

  • Type: Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), anti-ship variant.
  • Propulsion: Two-stage, solid-fuel rocket.
  • Range: Approximately 1,500 to 1,700 kilometres (930–1,050 miles).
  • Warhead: Conventional high-explosive or manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV); potentially nuclear-capable.
  • Guidance system: Inertial navigation combined with satellite guidance (Beidou) and terminal radar or optical seeker for precision targeting.
  • Accuracy: Estimated circular error probable (CEP) of less than 20–30 metres, sufficient for large naval targets.
  • Launch platform: Road-mobile Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL), enhancing survivability and mobility.

The DF-21D’s defining feature is its manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV), which allows the missile to adjust trajectory during the terminal phase, enabling it to track and strike moving targets such as warships. This capability differentiates it from traditional ballistic missiles designed for fixed targets.

Operational Role and Strategic Purpose

The DF-21D plays a central role in China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy—an approach intended to prevent or delay adversary forces from operating freely near China’s coastline and territorial waters.
Its primary operational purposes include:

  1. Anti-ship warfare: Targeting high-value naval assets, particularly U.S. aircraft carriers, which are symbols of power projection in the Indo-Pacific.
  2. Deterrence: Creating strategic uncertainty for potential adversaries, thereby discouraging intervention in regional conflicts such as a Taiwan contingency.
  3. Regional power projection: Strengthening China’s control over its maritime periphery, including the South China Sea and East China Sea.
  4. Complement to other systems: Operating alongside land-based cruise missiles, submarines, and long-range aircraft as part of an integrated joint-strike capability.

Targeting and Guidance Systems

One of the most challenging aspects of using ballistic missiles against moving targets at sea is real-time target acquisition and tracking. The DF-21D’s success depends on China’s ability to integrate multiple surveillance and reconnaissance systems, including:

  • Over-the-horizon (OTH) radar networks.
  • Reconnaissance satellites in low-earth orbit, including electro-optical, radar, and maritime surveillance satellites.
  • Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and maritime patrol aircraft providing target updates.
  • Data-link networks that relay targeting information to missile command systems in near real-time.

This network-centric approach enables the missile to receive mid-course corrections before entering its terminal phase, enhancing precision against mobile naval targets.

Deployment and Operational Status

The DF-21D is deployed under the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) and operates within China’s Theatre Commands, particularly the Eastern Theatre Command, which oversees operations related to Taiwan and the East China Sea.
It is typically deployed in brigades equipped with road-mobile launchers, allowing rapid relocation and concealment. Reports suggest that the DF-21D has been operational since around 2012, with several regiments fielded across coastal provinces such as Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangdong.

Comparative and Strategic Impact

The DF-21D’s introduction represents a major shift in maritime warfare, as it potentially alters the traditional advantage enjoyed by carrier battle groups. Its ability to strike large, moving ships from long distances gives China a strategic edge within the First Island Chain—a geographic stretch from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines.
This development has influenced regional and global military planning:

  • United States: The U.S. Navy has invested in countermeasures, such as Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) systems, electronic warfare, and deception technologies to mitigate the DF-21D threat.
  • Allied nations: Countries like Japan and Australia have strengthened cooperation with the U.S. and expanded their missile defence capabilities.
  • Arms competition: The missile’s deployment has spurred discussions about a missile race in the Indo-Pacific region, with multiple nations developing advanced precision-strike systems.

Countermeasures and Limitations

Despite its reputation as a “carrier killer,” analysts caution that the DF-21D’s effectiveness depends on several complex factors:

  • Intelligence and surveillance accuracy: Reliable, real-time tracking of moving targets remains technologically challenging.
  • Electronic and cyber warfare: Adversaries could disrupt the missile’s guidance systems through jamming or decoy operations.
  • Defensive interception: Modern naval defences, including the U.S. Navy’s SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors, are designed to engage ballistic threats during their flight phases.
  • Operational risk: Launching an attack on a U.S. carrier group could trigger major escalation, deterring its actual combat use.

Variants and Related Systems

The DF-21 family includes several variants:

  • DF-21A: Improved nuclear-capable MRBM.
  • DF-21C: Precision-guided conventional missile for land targets.
  • DF-21D: Anti-ship ballistic missile.
  • DF-26: Extended-range (4,000 km) ballistic missile, sometimes referred to as the “Guam killer,” capable of both conventional and anti-ship roles.

These variants form part of a layered strike system designed to project Chinese power across the Indo-Pacific region.

Strategic and Geopolitical Implications

The DF-21D’s deployment signifies China’s transformation into a maritime power capable of challenging U.S. naval supremacy. It enhances China’s deterrent posture and complicates operational planning for any foreign intervention in regional disputes.
In broader strategic terms:

  • It reinforces China’s sovereignty claims over contested maritime zones.
  • It contributes to the modernisation of the PLA, aligning with President Xi Jinping’s goal of building a “world-class military” by mid-century.
  • It compels rival powers to adapt new naval doctrines, incorporating dispersed formations, stand-off weapons, and stealth technologies.
Originally written on July 24, 2019 and last modified on October 4, 2025.

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