Basic Structure Doctrine

The Basic Structure Doctrine is a fundamental judicial principle in Indian constitutional law that limits the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution. It evolved from a series of landmark Supreme Court judgements which sought to balance the sovereignty of Parliament with the supremacy of the Constitution. The doctrine ensures that certain essential features of the Constitution cannot be altered, even through the constitutional amendment process, thereby protecting the core ideals of democracy and constitutionalism in India.

Background and Constitutional Framework

The Indian Constitution empowers both Parliament and State Legislatures to make laws within their respective jurisdictions. However, these powers are not absolute, being subject to judicial review, which acts as a safeguard against arbitrary legislative actions. Judicial review derives its authority from Articles 13, 32, 226 and 245 of the Constitution.

• Article 13 renders void any law contravening the Fundamental Rights (Part III).
• Articles 32 and Article 226 empower the Supreme Court and High Courts to enforce Fundamental Rights.
• Article 245 subjects the legislative powers of both Parliament and State Legislatures to the Constitution.

The judiciary, therefore, emerged as the guardian of both Fundamental Rights and the Constitution, setting the stage for a series of judicial interventions that ultimately led to the formulation of the Basic Structure Doctrine.

The Right to Property and the First Amendment

Following independence, India embarked on land reforms and agrarian restructuring to realise the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), particularly Article 39(b) and (c), which advocate equitable distribution of resources and prevention of wealth concentration. However, property rights were then protected as Fundamental Rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31, leading to conflicts between reformist legislation and constitutional guarantees.
When the courts struck down Zamindari abolition laws as unconstitutional, the First Constitutional Amendment (1951) introduced Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule to protect such laws from judicial scrutiny. Initially, 13 land reform laws were placed under the Ninth Schedule, but over time, the Schedule expanded to include over 280 Acts—many unrelated to property reforms—thus raising concerns about its misuse.
The Sankari Prasad (1952) and Sajjan Singh (1955) cases upheld Parliament’s power to amend any part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, marking an early phase of cooperation between the judiciary and the legislature. However, this harmony did not last long.

The Golak Nath Case (1967)

The Golak Nath v. State of Punjab case marked the first major judicial reversal. The Supreme Court, by a 6–5 majority, held that Parliament had no power to amend Fundamental Rights, interpreting amendments as “law” under Article 13(2). The Court reasoned that Fundamental Rights held a “permanent and transcendental” place in the Constitution and could not be abridged even by a constitutional amendment. The judgment thus imposed implied limitations on the Parliament’s amending power.

Political Context: Bank Nationalisation and Privy Purse Abolition

During Indira Gandhi’s tenure, the government nationalised 14 major banks (1969) and abolished the Privy Purse granted to former princes. Both actions were challenged in the Supreme Court.
In R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970), the Court upheld nationalisation but insisted that the right to compensation under Article 19(1)(f) must be fair and just. In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India (1970), the Court struck down the abolition of the Privy Purse as unconstitutional, reinforcing the judiciary’s role as constitutional guardian.

Constitutional Amendments and the Legislative-Judicial Conflict

To counter these judgements, the government enacted several key amendments:

• 24th Amendment (1971): Restored Parliament’s power to amend any part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, and made the President’s assent mandatory for such bills.
• 25th Amendment (1971): Restricted the right to property and introduced Article 31C, insulating laws implementing Article 39(b) and (c) from judicial review.
• 26th Amendment (1971): Formally abolished the Privy Purse.
• 29th Amendment (1972): Added two Kerala Land Reform Acts to the Ninth Schedule.

These measures intensified the confrontation between Parliament and the judiciary, culminating in the Kesavananda Bharati case.

The Kesavananda Bharati Case (1973)

The Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala case became a constitutional landmark. The 13-judge bench—the largest ever in India—examined whether Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 was unlimited. The Court’s verdict, delivered on 24 April 1973, held by a 7–6 majority that:

• Parliament could amend any part of the Constitution.
• However, it could not alter or destroy its “basic structure”.

The term basic structure was first used during arguments in the Golak Nath case and drew intellectual inspiration from German jurist Dietrich Conrad. Though the judges did not define the basic structure exhaustively, they listed its key components, including the supremacy of the Constitution, democracy, secularism, rule of law, separation of powers, and federalism.
This judgement effectively overruled Golak Nath, upheld the 24th Amendment, and partially upheld the 25th and 29th Amendments. Justice H.R. Khanna’s decisive opinion established that while Parliament’s power to amend was wide, it was not unlimited.

Post-Kesavananda Developments

The Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) case was the first to apply the Basic Structure Doctrine. The Court struck down Article 329A, inserted by the 39th Amendment, as unconstitutional for undermining free and fair elections—a fundamental feature of democracy. This case reaffirmed the doctrine’s authority and listed unamendable features such as:

• Sovereign democratic republic status,
• Equality of status and opportunity,
• Secularism,
• Rule of law.

Subsequent attempts to review Kesavananda Bharati, notably by Chief Justice A.N. Ray, failed due to internal judicial resistance.

Later Judicial Affirmations

The doctrine was reaffirmed in a series of landmark cases:

• Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980): Struck down parts of the 42nd Amendment that gave unlimited amending power to Parliament, reaffirming that judicial review and Fundamental Rights are part of the basic structure.
• Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981): Drew a distinction between amendments made before and after April 24, 1973, holding only post-Kesavananda amendments subject to review under the doctrine.
• S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): Recognised secularism, democracy, and federalism as essential features.
• I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007): Held that even laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 1973 are subject to review if they violate the basic structure.

The Forty-Second Amendment and Judicial Response

The Forty-Second Amendment (1976), often called a “mini-Constitution,” attempted to nullify the doctrine by declaring Parliament’s amending power unlimited and beyond judicial scrutiny. However, in Minerva Mills (1980), the Supreme Court struck down Sections 4 and 55 of this amendment, holding that giving Parliament unlimited power would itself destroy the Constitution’s basic structure.

Components of the Basic Structure

Although there is no definitive list, judicial interpretation has consistently identified the following as basic features:

• Supremacy of the Constitution
• Rule of law and judicial review
• Federalism and separation of powers
• Democracy and free elections
• Secularism and equality
• Independence of judiciary
• Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles balance
• Unity and integrity of the nation

Criticism and Significance

Critics argue that the doctrine lacks explicit textual support in the Constitution and gives excessive power to the judiciary, making constitutional validity subject to judicial interpretation. They also claim it undermines the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.
Nevertheless, the Basic Structure Doctrine remains a cornerstone of Indian constitutionalism. It prevents the erosion of democratic values and preserves the supremacy of the Constitution over transient political majorities. Scholars widely agree that without this judicial safeguard, India might have drifted towards authoritarianism, especially during the Emergency (1975–77).