Nehru’s Tibet Policy

Officially, India / Nehru had no policy document on Tibet. India’s support to China on recognition of Tibet (as part of China) was basically one of the few actions of Nehru aimed at establishing strong relationship with China. The other actions were: India supported China on Korea war; supported PRC’s admission in UN and also a permanent seat for it; China’s peace treaty with Japan; transfer of Taiwan to PRC; question of Indo-China and Afro-Asian conference. However, Nehru’s move to accommodate Dalai Lama overshadowed his other actions and became one of the major factors leading to Sino-India War in 1962.

Background

Tibet has always been a subject of invasion and occupation. While many a times, Tibet was invaded by other countries, for several centuries, Tibet itself had been an avid invader.  British had sustained Tibet as a buffer zone; but at the time of Independence of India, Tibet had de facto independent status under Chinese suzerainty. After 1949, the PRC came into being and India urged China to let Tibet be an autonomous region. But in 1950, 20,000 People’s Liberation Army troops entered into Tibet and ended its independent status. Tibet was now occupied by China. As China neared its victory in Tibet, Nehru rushed through a series of defense treaties with Bhutan (1949), Nepal (1950) and Sikkim (1950). These countries constituted Nehru’s definition of a redrawn security zone. Throughout 1950s, Nehru tried to demonstrate his serious commitment towards this Himalayan doctrine. In February 1951, Nehru established the North and North-Eastern Defence Committee and visited the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), Sikkim and Bhutan. In summary, Nehru offered support to Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim in case of Chinese invasion.

China treated India’s actions as “expansionist”. This claim was also based on the premise that Tibetan Buddhism was under influence of India for many centuries. The reception of Dalai Lama in 1959 by India humiliated Mao Zedong and he claimed that rebellion in Tibet was incited by Indians. In 1959, Mao published “The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy” in which he accused Nehru of encouraging Tibetan rebels. Somehow, India failed to counter these claims of China.

This apart, India’s closeness to USSR led to China assume that it was surrounded by enemies. During a 1959 border clash, USSR called for talks and reaffirmed friendship with both India and China. However, USSR started furnishing military equipments to India. In 1962, the Soviet Union agreed to transfer technology to co-produce the MiG-21 jet fighter in India, which the Soviet Union had earlier denied to China.

Was recognizing Tibet as part of China a strategic mistake of India?

There are three angles to consider this question. Firstly, if we consider that entertaining Dalai Lama was not correct and avoiding him could have fostered long term good relationship with India; then certainly recognition given to Tibet was a strategic mistake. Secondly, if we consider that India-China friendship is a utopian thinking and India should have been more pragmatic in its China policy, then also it appears that India did a mistake. Thirdly, if we consider China’s claims that India was following an expansionist policy and by not recognizing Tibet as integral part of India, India would have possibly confirm China’s claims by not recognizing Tibet as part of China. It’s worth note here that India actually never challenged Chinese authority over Tibet.  In reality, India did a favour to China by surrendering its extra-territorial rights over Tibet inherited from British. But despite this, India’s policy was a confused cocktail of idealism, realism and pragmatism